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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
ACT DECLARING SALE OF FILLED MILK TO BE FRAUD UPON PUBLIC.

-The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Carolene Products
Co. v. McLaughlin,' recently decided that the statute passed by
the General Assembly of Illinois and known as the Filled Milk
Act 2 was unconstitutional. The plaintiff was a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling two products known

as Carolene and Milnut. They are composed of skimmed milk to
which is added cocoanut oil to replace all of the milk fat which
has been extracted. It was admitted that both skimmed milk and
cocoanut oil when used separately or when combined are nutritious and wholesome. There was evidence introduced that the

said compounds contained little or no vitamin "A."

It was

1 365 Ill. 62, 5 N. E. (2d) 447 (1936).
The Statute, Laws of 1935, page 886; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats.
(1935), Ch. 56%, §§ 19c - 19e, reads as follows:
"Sec. 19c. The term 'filled milk' means any milk, cream or skimmed milk,
whether or not condensed, evaporated, concentrated or desiccated, or any of
the fluid derivatives of any of them, to which has been added any fat or oil
other than milk fat....
"See. 19d. 'filled milk' as herein defined, is an adulterated food and its
sale constitutes a fraud upon the public.
"Sec. 19e. It shall be unlawful for any person, by himself, his servant or
agent, or as the servant or agent of another, to manufacture for sale within
this State or sell or exchange, or have in his possession with intent to sell or
exchange, any 'filled milk' as defined in this Act."
2
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further admitted that the absence of this vitamin is not injurious
to the health of adults while on the other hand its absence is
deleterious to infants if it continues for a considerable time. The
only actual fraud alleged arose in the case of two or three retail
merchants who sold the said products as condensed milk. There
was no contention that Carolene or Milnut were misbranded, as
the labels on the cans read as follows: "Especially prepared for
use in coffee, baking and for other culinary purposes. This product complies in all respects with the Federal Food and Drugs Act
of June 30, 1906, and is neither adulterated nor misbranded
under the provisions thereof." The court based its decision on
two propositions: first, that the statute was an arbitrary and
unreasonable use of the police power, and second, that Section 19d
of the said act was an invasion, by the legislature, of the province
of the judiciary.3
From an early date governments have passed laws, in the exercise of the police power, which prohibited certain acts because
they proved deleterious to the public health. 4 However, such acts
must be reasonable, 5 and when there is a doubt as to whether the
act is injurious to the public health, the judgment of the legislature upon the point is generally accepted by the courts.6 When
3 It is well to note that in the instant case, the court did not construe the
act as being primarily an adulteration act. For a like construction of similar
statutes, iee Carolene Products Co. v. Banning, 268 N. W. 313 (Neb., 1936) ;
Carolene Products Co. v. Thompson, 176 Mich. 172, 267 N. W. 608 (1936).
However, a similar statute was construed by Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case
of Hebe Company & Carnation Milk Products Company v. Shay, 24 U. S.
297, 39 S. Ct. 125, 63 L. Ed. 255 (1919), to be an adulteration act which
prescribed a certain standard for condensed milk. For a distinction between
the instant case, and Carolene Products v. Thompson, supra, see the latter
case.
4 Blackstone's Commentaries (Philadelphia: Robert H. Small, 1825), IV,
165---"2. A second, but much inferior species of offence against public health
is the selling of unwholesome provisions. To prevent which the Statute 51
Hen. III. st. 6, and the ordinance for bakers, c. 7, prohibit the sale of corrupted wine, contagious or unwholesome flesh, or flesh that is bought of a
Jew; under pain of amercement for the first offence, pillory for the second,
fine and imprisonment for the third, and abjuration of the town for the
fourth. And by the statute 12 Car. II. c. 25, § 11, any brewing or adulteration of wine is punished with the forfeiture of 1001. if done by the wholesale
merchant; and 401. if done by vintner or retail trader. These are all the
offences which may properly be said to respect the public health."
Rex v. John Dixon, 3 M. & S. 11, 105 Eng. Rep. 516 (1814), "Mixing alum
with bread in such manner as that crude lumps were found in the bread, was
holden to be indictable."
5 Purity Extract and Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 57 L. Ed. 184
(1912); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U. S. 498, 63 L. Ed. 381
(1919).
6 This principle is stated in Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226
U. S. 192, 57 L. Ed. 184 (1912), by the United States Supreme Court, as
follows: "With the wisdom of the exercise of that judgment the court has
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courts consider an act passed under the police power, the inquiry
must always be whether, considering the end in view, the statute
passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a
merely arbitrary fiat. 7 It is not within the scope of the police
power to deprive a citizen of valuable property rights under the
guise of prohibiting or regulating some business or occupation
that has no tendency to injure the public health or morals or
affect the general welfare.
The judgment of the legislature is not necessarily conclusive,
therefore, since it is a question subject to review by the courts
as to whether the act in question has any vital relation to the
public health.8 The statute in the instant case did not prohibit
subtractions from, merely additions to, milk. There was no fraud
by the plaintiff, the only fraud that might arise would be with
respect to isolated instances of resale by retail merchants and
this is too remote and uncertain to come within the province of
the legislature under the police power. And too, the products
were admittedly wholesome. Clearly, therefore, the legislature
exceeded the limits of its authority in attempting to prohibit the
sale of the compounds. To hold otherwise would mean that the
legislature might unreasonably impair as well as conserve the
property rights of the individual. To extend this principle to
other trades would enable the legislature to ban many common
articles, such as syrup, not all maple, shoes, not all leather, and
the like. It is patent that the police power was never intended
to be so construed.
no concern; and unless it clearly appears that the enactment has no substantial relation to a proper purpose, it cannot be said that the limit of legislative power has been transcended. To hold otherwise would be to substitute
judicial opinion of expediency for the will of the legislature-a notion foreign
to our constitutional system." See also Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope. 248 U. S.
498, 63 L. Ed. 381 (1919) ; People v. Henning Co., 260 Ill. 554, 103 N. E. 530,
49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1206 (1913); People v. Price, 257 Ill. 587, 101 N. E.
196, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1154 (1913).
7 Hebe Co. & Carnation Milk Products Co. v. Shaw, 248 U. S. 297, 39
S. Ct. 125, 63 L. Ed. 255 (1919) ; Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 35 S. Ct.
892, 59 L. Ed. 1400 (1915).
8 Koos v. Saunders, 349 Ill. 492, 182 N. E. 415 (1932) ; Frazer v. Shelton,
320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696 (1926) ; Gillespie v. People, 188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E.
1007, 52 A. L. R. 283, 80 Am. St. Rep. 176 (1900) ; People v. Belcastro, 356
Ill. 144, 190 N. E. 301, 92 A. L. R. 1223 (1934) ; Banghart v. Walsh, 339 Ill.
132, 171 N. E. 154 (1930) ; People v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N. E. 815,
22 A. L. R. 835 (1922); People v. Steele, 231 Ill. 340, 83 N. E. 236, 14
L. R. A. (N. S.) 361, 121 Am. St. Rep. 321 (1907) ; Ramsey v. People, 142
II. 380, 32 N. E. 364 (1892) ; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454
(1895) ; Bailey v. People, 190 Ill. 28, 60 N. E. 98 (1901) ; People v. Weiner,
271 Il1. 74, 110 N. E. 870 (1915); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U. S.
402, 46 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. Ed. 654 (1926) ; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
42 F. (2d) 913 (1930).
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In considering the second proposition, the court pointed out
that Section 19d of the Act, under discussion, provided that the
sale of filled milk constituted a fraud upon the public. If such
a provision, unjustifiable under the police power, were to be
sustained, where is the line to be drawn? In the instant ease,
the provision was treated as a conclusive presumption of fraud,
and it was urged by the plaintiff that it was unconstitutional,
because it was made conclusive instead of merely prima facie.9
It was contended by the defendant, on the other hand, that this
provision was really a change in the substantive law. It is well
settled that the legislature may change the substantive law,10 and
whether this is done in the form of a conclusive presumption or
9 The legislature may say that proof of one fact in issue shall be prima
facie evidence of another fact, as this merely serves the purpose of shifting
the burden of going forward with the evidence, and since the slightest bit of
evidence will overcome the presumption, a person is not denied due process
of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See C. B. & Q.
R. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361, 37 N. E. 247, 41 Am. St. Rep. 278, 24
L. R. A. 141 (1894) ; Meadowcroft v. People, 163 I1. 56, 45 N. E. 303, 54
Am. St. Rep. 447, 35 L. R. A. 171 (1896); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S.
219, 31 S. Ct. 145, 55 L. Ed. 191 (1911) ; Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136, 55 L. Ed. 78, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 226, Ann.
Cas. 1912A, 463 (1910); United States v. Luria, 184 F. 643 (1911), aff'd,
231 U. S. 9, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101 (1913) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 55 L. Ed. 369 (1910) ; Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437,
56 L. Ed. 497 (1912) ; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, (7th ed., 1903)
p. 524; People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 P. 767 (1929), cert. denied, 50
S. Ct. 87, 74 L. Ed. 592 (1929). The only limitations on the exercise of this
power are these: (1) There must be some rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed: (12) thc inference of the existence of the ultimate fact from proof of the other fact must not be so
unreasonable or unnatural as to be a purely arbitrary mandate; and (3) the
defendant must not be deprived of a proper opportunity to present his
rebuttal to the main fact so presumed and thus preserve his right to have the
case submitted upon all the evidence. Fenner v. Boykin, 3 F. (2d) 674
(1925) ; Hawes v. State of Georgia, 32 S. Ct. 204, 258 U. S. 1, 66 L.
Ed. 431 (1922) ; Shellenbarger v. Illinois Central Railroad, 278 Ill. 333,
116 N. E. 170, L. R. A. 1917E, 1011 (1917) ; People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y.
32, 34 N. E. 759, 36 Am. St. Rep. 668 (1893) ; McFarland v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498, 60 L. Ed. 899 (1916) ; Hall
v. Johnson, 87 Ore. 21, 169 P. 515, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 49 (1917); State v.
Beach, 147 Ind. 74, 43 N. E. 949, 36 L. R. A. 179 (1896) ; Robertson v.
People, 20 Colo. 279, 38 P. 326 (1894) ; Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S. E.
74, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007 (1905) ; State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So.
271, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1011. 113 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1906) ; State v.
Sheppard, 64 Kan. 451, 67 P. 870 (1902) ; Parsons v. State, 61 Neb. 244,
85 N. W. 65 (1901).
10 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 61 L. Ed. 678 (1917) ; Orient Ins.
Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. Ed. 552 (1899) ; Hawker v. New York,
170 U. S. 189, 42 L. Ed. 1002 (1898) ; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 41 L.
Ed. 677 (1897) ; Street v. Farmers' Elevator Co., 34 S. D. 523,149 N. W. 429
(1914) ; Conrad v. Smith, 6 N. D. 337, 70 N. W. 815 (1897) ; State v. District Court, 139 Minn. 409, 166 N. W. 772 (1918) ; State v. La Pointe, 81
N. H. 227, 123 A. 692 (1924) ; Matter of Buchanan, 171 N. Y. S. 708 (1918).
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by some other means, is immaterial, since it is wholly within the
power of the legislature. However, this power is not unlimited,
for when an act is violative of either the Federal or state constitutions, it is beyond the power of the legislature. Thus, we see that
when the legislature lacks the power to change the substantive
law they can not do so by a conclusive presumption. To hold
otherwise would be to say that the legislature may escape constitutional restrictions by doing indirectly what they are without
the power to do directly.
In the present case, the legislature did not have the power to
make a change in the substantive law by the method adopted,
because it was violative of both the state and Federal constitutions.
This disability could not be removed by the assertion that the
It is not
legislature made a change in the rules of evidence.'
within the province of the legislature to declare that to be a factas was done in the instant case-which is clearly shown not to
be a fact, since such a statute would operate to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it, and for that reason it would be violative of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.12 Clearly the court was correct in its

holding.
H. N. LnGoLE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
EMPLOYMENT STATUTE RELATING TO POISONOUS FUMES AND DUST.

-The Illinois Supreme Court held recently in the case of Agnew
v. Woodruff & Edwards, Inc.,' that the provisions of an act
concerning "Protection from Poisonous Fumes or Dust,' 12 to the
11 Mobile v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 55 L. Ed. 78 (1910).
12 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 55 L. Ed. 191 (1911).
1 365 Ill. 384, 6 N. E. (2d) 623 (1937).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 48, § 134 et seq. The act provides as follows: "That every employer of labor in this State, engaged in
the manufacture, repairing or altering of any metals, wares or merchandise
which may produce or generate poisonous or noxious fumes or dusts in harmful quantities, such as metal polishing, grinding, plating and dipping of metals
in acid solution or dips, are hereby declared to be especially dangerous to the
health of the employees so engaged. Such manufacture, repairing or altering
of any metals or merchandise in such processes and places of employment
shall be conducted in rooms lying wholly above the surface of the ground."
Sections 136 and 137 of the act further provide that for its violation, the
employer shall be fined, and that, for an injury to the health of any employee
caused by the employer's willful violation of the act or willful failure to
comply with any of its provisions, the employee shall have a right of action
for injuries to his health caused proximately by such violation; in case of
loss of life occasioned by such willful violation or willful failure to comply
with such provisions, a cause of action was allowed the widow, "lineal heirs,"
adopted chldren or other dependents.
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effect that certain processes of manufacture were declared to be
especially dangerous to the health of employees so engaged and
were required to be conducted in rooms lying wholly above the
surface of the ground, were invalid as not having a direct relation, in some degree, towards the protection of the health of
employees engaged in the types of labor mentioned.
The plaintiff, having sustained an injury to his health, and
having no cause of action at common law for such injuries,3
brought an action to recover under this statute. As the defendant
made a motion in the nature of a demurrer, challenging the constitutionality of the act, that was the only question before the
court. It was stated that if the act could be sustained it would
be only by virtue of the police power. When it was pointed out
that the production of deleterious gases and dusts, and not the
location of the business where the same are produced is the agency
which inflicts injuries to the workmen's health, and that the act
did not apply to the same businesses carried on above the ground,
notwithstanding that such fumes and dusts might there be produced, the court without hesitation declared the act to be unconstitutional. It was declared that "the legislature has the unquestioned right, under the police power to adopt reasonable laws for
the protection of the health of those engaged as laborers in industry, but it cannot, by calling a statute a health measure, arbitrarily and capriciously deprive the owner of his property. Section 1
of the act ... unlawfully discriminates between persons similarly
nr
iq Pn iflvnQin~ fldV T r
n
~itiiaed
an;;
rights un-der a purported
police power."
In the instant case employers engaged in businesses that might
be the valid subject of regulation for the protection of the health
of their employees under the police power 4 are classified arbitrarily as to the location of their business above or below the surface
of the ground. It is not doubted that the legislature has the power
to classify persons or objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or control and to pass laws applicable only to such persons
or objects. 5 However, the legislature cannot make an arbitrary
classification and then limit a statute in its operation to such
class.6
____aer

.

8 McCreery v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 363 Ill. 321, 2 N. E. (2d)
290 (1936) ; Vogel v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 363 Il. 473, 2 N. E.
(2d) 716 (1936).
4 People v. Smith, 108 Mich. 527, 66 N. W. 382 (1896).
5 People v. Edmands, 252 Ill. 108, 96 N. E. 914 (1911); People v. Kaelber,
253 II. 552, 97 N. E. 1068 (1912) ; Rogers v. Carterville Coal Co., 254 I1.
104, 98 N. E. 270 (1912); Cook v. Big Muddy-Carterville Mining Co., 249
Ill.
41, 94 N. E. 90 (1911).
6 People v. Schenck, 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994 (1913).
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In Bailey v. People,7 an act made it unlawful for more than six
persons to occupy the same room for sleeping purposes at the
same time "in any lodging house," and prohibited the occupation
of any room in a lodging house which did not contain at least
"four hundred cubic feet or more of space for each person sleeping therein at the same time." The act was held unconstitutional,
because the classification of the places affected by the act was not
based on substantial differences existing between lodging houses
and other public places where lodging was furnished to the
public, such as boarding houses, inns, hotels, and the like.
Another instance of an unreasonable classification is to be
noted in Starne v. People,s in which an act, generally known as
the "Miners Washhouse Act," requiring owners and operators
of coal mines to provide and maintain a washhouse for employees
who worked in mines was held unconstitutional. It was there
pointed out that there is no substantial difference between an
employee who worked in a coal mine, in respect to the condition
of his person at the close of his day's work, and many other
employees such as those who work in foundries, machine shops,
and the like.9
It is interesting to note that the case principally relied upon by
the court in deciding the instant case was that of People v.
Sehenck."0 That case dealt with an act concerning employees
operating emery wheels and similar grinding or polishing machinery in any room lying wholly or partly beneath the surface of
the ground. The act was declared unconstitutional, and the present decision, adopting the reasoning used in that case, stated that
7 190 Ill. 28, 60 N. E. 98 (1901).

8 222 IIl. 189, 78 N. E. 61 (1908).

9 The following are further instances in which statutes were declared

unconstitutional. An ordinance, requiring motor vehicles designed for carrying freight and merchandise of fifteen hundred pounds' capacity or more to be
equipped with a fender in the front end in such a manner as to prevent injury
to pedestrians, was held discriminatory, having no reasonable basis for
classification. Consumers' Co. v. City of Chicago, 298 Ill. 239, 131 N. E. 628
(1921). Where a statute singled out owners and operators of coal mines as
a distinct class and required that they provide scales for the weighing of coal
at the mines, and making such weight the basis of wages, was held to be
unconstitutional on the ground that such a statute imposed burdens upon such
owners and operators not imposed on other owners of property or employers
of laborers. Millet v. People, 117 I1. 294, 7 N. E. 631 (1886). An act prohibiting the sale and use of cans, boxes, bottles, etc., having the registered
mark of the owner, without his consent, was held to be in contravention of
the provisions in the Illinois Constitution prohibiting special legislation, as
it gave the owners of property of the class named rights not enjoyed by

owners of property of other classes. Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Laboratory
Co., 205 Ill. 497, 68 N. E. 938 (1903). See also Lippman v. People, 175 IIl.
101, 51 N. E. 872 (1898), to the same effect.
10 257 Ill. 384, 100 N. E. 994 (1913).
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there was no substantial legal difference between the two acts.
It should be further noted that after this action was commenced
the statute involved was expressly repealed by another, the
"Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act."11
So it may be said that the evil at which this statute was aimed
deserves eradication, but that it cannot be accomplished by an act
which does not attempt to set up a standard by which all manufacturers operating such mechanical processes mentioned in the
act are to be regulated and governed.
E. J. MEDLIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TRIAL BY JURY-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

ALTERNATE JUROR STATUTE.-The Court of Errors and Appeals
of New Jersey, in State v. Dolbow,1 held that a statute, 2 authorizing the trial court to impanel fourteen jurors in a criminal trial
which promises to be protracted, and providing for elimination
of two by lot before the jury retired for deliberation if they had
not been before that time excused by the court, was not unconstitutional as depriving the defendant of the right to trial by jury.
The act in question also provides that the jury shall have the
same qualifications and be impaneled and sworn in the same
manner as other juries as provided for by law, that all fourteen
juror shall sit and hear the cause, that when any condition
arises "during the trial of said cause, which, in the opinion of
the trial court, justifies the excusal of any of the jurors so impaneled from further service, he may do so, and the said trial
shall proceed, unless the number of said jurors shall be reduced
to less than twelve."a
Dolbow had been indicted and convicted of murder, and the
principal ground relied on for reversal was that the foregoing
statute was unconstitutional in that it deprived the accused of the4
right of a trial by jury as guaranteed by the state constitution.
It was urged in support of this contention that the certain twelve
who rendered the verdict were not definitely ascertained until the
proofs were closed. The court, in answer thereto, suggested that
inasmuch as legally chosen jurors were supposed to be indifferent
between the parties, their individual character and personality
should likewise be a matter of indifference.
It was also urged that, inasmuch as it was in the discretion of
the judge to order this special jury and to excuse a juror should
11 Smith-Hurd's Il. Stats. Annotated (1936 Supp.) Cb. 48, § 172.33 note.
1 189 A. 915 (N. J. L., 1937).
2 N. J. St. Ann. 1935, §§ 53-11a to 53-11c.
3 Ibid.
4 Const. N. J., Art. I, par. 7.
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a condition arise during the trial justifying such course, too
broad a power was vested in the trial judge. This was answered
by an observation of the court that there was no safer place to
deposit such authority and that no danger existed in giving the
trial judge discretion to excuse a juror. A dissenting opinion by
Justice Case was based on this contention.
Other states, in seeking to eliminate the evil of a mistrial due
to the death, illness, or other incapacity of jurors, have adopted
somewhat similar acts. 5 The provisions of these acts, however,
are chiefly concerned with the selection of alternate jurors as
such, instead of the choice of a number from which twelve are
ultimately to be drawn by lot, as6 is the procedure under the New
Jersey statute under discussion.
In People v. Mitchell,7 the New York Court of Appeals held
constitutional a statutory provision for the calling of alternate
jurors, who were required to be discharged when the original
twelve retired for deliberation, if they or one of them had not
already taken the seat of a discharged juror. In California a like
provision for the calling of an alternate juror, by the judge, when
it appeared to him that the trial would be protracted, was held
to be constitutional in People v. Peete.8 It was necessary for
such alternate to have the same qualifications, take the same
oath, and be subject to the same number of challenges as other
jurors. In the latter case, the court observed that the legislature
has the right to make any reasonable regulation or condition respecting the enjoyment of trial by jury, provided only that the
essentials of a jury trial as known to the common law remain
unchanged. The essential and substantive attributes or elements
of jury trial are number, impartiality, and unanimity. 9 A provision for alternate jurors does not affect any of these attributes. 10
In this country, where the constitutions provide that the right
of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as part of the law of the
land, or the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate," the
words "trial by jury" import a trial by jury as at common law. 12
5 California, New York, Michigan and Ohio are examples. The New

Jersey court erroneously enumerates Illinois as a state having substantially
similar legislation.
6 Code of Ohio (1934), secs. 11419-47; Compiled Laws of Michigan
(1929), secs. 14334, 17311.
7 266 N. Y. 15, 193 N. E. 445 (1934).
8 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 P. 51 (1921).
9 Lommen v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. 53 (1896).
10 People v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 P. 51 (1921).
11 Const. Ill., Art. II, sec. 5. "The right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed, shall remain inviolate."
12 Brown v. State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 A. 811 (1899).
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The proposed Criminal Code for Illinois 5 contains a provision
giving the court discretion, when the trial is likely to be a protracted one, to direct the calling of one or two additional jurors,
to be known as "alternate jurors." Under it, such jurors are to
be drawn from the same source, and in the same manner, and
have the same qualifications as regular jurors, and be subject to
examination and challenge as such jurors, except that each defendant will be allowed one peremptory challenge to each juror to
be chosen. Such "alternate jurors" are required to take the
same oath, and they must have equal facilities for seeing and
hearing the proceedings of the case. The court may order such
"alternate juror" to take the place of a regular juror in case of
death or discharge, and if there be two "alternate jurors," the
court must select one by lot to take the vacant place in the jury
14
box.
It would seem that the inquiry in cases of this sort is always
whether or not there is a "reasonable" regulation by the legislature of the right to trial by jury, and so long as such statutes
do not materially impair that right, their constitutionality will
be upheld.
E. J. MEDIN
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-IMPEACHING
ACTER WITNESSES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION

DEFENDANT'S CHARBY R UMORS OF DE-

FENDANT'S MISCON'DUCT.-In People v. Page' the Supreme Court
of Illinois reaffirmed its view that evidence of particular acts of
misconduct by the defendant, whether based on rumor2 or on
personal knowledge,8 is inadmissible to impeach his character
witnesses in a criminal case. As the weight of authority 4 permits proof of rumors of particular misconduct by the accused for
such purpose, this inquiry is directed primarily toward the
advisability of that doctrine.
Senate Bill No. 87, sec. 426; House Bill 214, sec. 426.
14 Senate Bill No. 87, sec. 426; House Bill 214, sec. 426.
1 365 Ill. 524, 6 N. E. (2d) 845 (1937).
2 McCarty v. People, 51 Ill. 231 (1869); Gifford v. People, 87 Ill. 210
(1877); Aiken v. People, 183 Ill. 215, 55 N. E. 695 (1899); Jennings v.
People, 189 Ill. 320, 59 N. E. 515 (1901) ; People v. Willy, 301 Ill. 307, 133
N. E. 859 (1921), syllabus note 4 is contra, but dictum; People v. Williams,
316 Ill. 575, 147 N. E. 443 (1925).
3 McCarty v. People, 51 Ill. 231 (1869); People v. Willy, 301 Ill. 307,
133 N. E. 859 (1921); People v. Celmars, 332 Ill. 113, 163 N. E. 421 (1928);
People v. Anderson, 337 Il1. 310, 169 N. E. 243 (1929).
4 See 71 A. L. R. 1498 and note, citing all states except Illinois, North
Carolina, Florida and Nebraska in accord. The basic case appears to be
Rex v. Wood, 5 Jur. 225 (Eng.) (1841).
'3
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There is no doubt that good or bad character is relevant to show
the probability that the accused did not or did do the criminal
act charged. However, the benignity of the law gives the defendant the privilege of putting his good character at issue in
the first instance. Once confined to capital cases, and then to
doubtful cases because of the misconception that admissibility
hinged upon weight, the privilege has been extended to all criminal cases. But the exercise of that privilege has been restricted
so that the character trait in issue must be directly at variance
with the nature of the crime charged,5 and the accused may avail
himself of only one mode of proof, i.e.. his current general reputation in the community in which he lives. The state may then
cross-examine his character witnesses or rebut their testimony by
testimony of its own witnesses. 6
Since an early case, the prosecution in Illinois has been denied
the right to cross-examine defendant's witnesses as to rumors of
his prior misconduct, because "every man is preseumed ready at
all times to defend his general character, but not his individual
acts-of those he must have due notice. '" Another case states
that the accused has the right to have the evidence confined to
the charge in the indictment. 8 These premises are erroneous,
according to the majority view, for the purpose is not to prove
specific acts of misconduct on his part, but to impeach the credibility of his character witnesses only.9 The accused is not involved. If the state can prove that these witnesses knew of such
rumors, their credibility is shaken, for the jury may infer that
they are mistaken, lying, or uninformed. If no rumors discrediting the accused have been heard, then the impeachment fails.
5 For example, the trait involved in rape is chastity and not character as
a "peaceable and quiet citizen," Wistrand v. People, 218 Ill. 323, 75 N. E. 891
(1905) ; nor as attentive to duty and sober minded, People v. Celmars, 332
Ill. 113, 163 N. E. 421 (1928). It is irrelevant that the accused is "peaceable"
392, 133 N. E. 292 (1921).
in case of larceny, People v. Redola, 300 Ill.
6 16 C. J. 580-83, sec. 1122-25; Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed., Little,
Brown & Co., 1923) I, 269-74, sec. 55-58; Edgington v. United States, 164
U. S.361, 17 S. Ct. 72, 41 L. Ed. 467 (1896) ; Hopps v. People, 31 11. 385,
83 Am. Dec. 231 (1863) ; 8 R. C. L. 207-09, sec. 202-05.
7 McCarty v. People, 51 Ill.
231 (1869).
8 Aiken v. People, 183 Ill. 215, 55 N. E. 695 (1899).
9 State v. Rowell, 172 Iowa 208, 154 N. W. 488 (1915) ; Randall v. State,
132 Ind. 539, 32 N. E. 305 (1892) ; People v. Laudiero, 192 N. Y. 304, 85
N. E. 132 (1908) ; Best on Evidence, I, sec. 261; Spalitto v. United States,
39 F. (2d) 782 (1930), which relies on Wigmore on Evidence (2d. ed.) II,
413, sec. 988. It is interesting to note from an examination of numerous cases

that the cases cite Wigmore on Evidence as to the purpose of the evidence

but fail entirely to consider the serious objections to such evidence, stated
on pp. 416-17, sec. 988 and p. 633, sec. 1111.
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Yet, most of these courts, 10 and Illinois also," adhere to the
doctrine of Regina v. Rowton,x2 which holds that evidence of personal knowledge or opinion of those acquainted with the accused
is inadmissible whether by direct examination of defendant's own
witnesses or on cross-examination. The objection is that such
inquiry not only tends to raise confusion and a multiplicity of
issues, but is also apt to bring out petty scandal and mislead the
jury. Moreover, it has been firmly established that proof of
particular acts of misconduct is inadmissible for the purpose
of impeachment, as the
inferences of guilt from prior miscon3
duct would be strong.'
In view of these premises, it appears illogical to permit evidence of rumors of specific misconduct, as is done under the
majority view, and yet at the same time to disallow proof of
personal knowledge by those acquainted with the accused. If
the purpose of evidence is proof to a moral certainty, rumors have
a very remote probative value, as they are hearsay at the best.
True, the purpose of such evidence is to impeach the character
witness, but will the jury in fact consider it as such or will it
deem the evidence as proof of particular acts of misconduct by
the defendant, thereby judging him by his prior misconduct
rather than by the act charged in the indictment ?14 No particular answer can be given, but it is certain that the majority method
affords greater possibilities for such misjudgment.
The Illinois method has been criticized on the ground that it
affords no test of the credibility of defendant's character witnesses to disclose fabrication. 15 The other view, however, fails
to consider that the nature of a rumor question is leading in most
instances, therefore demanding a limited reply. If the witness
wants to perjure himself he could easily do so by steadily answering "no."
The majority asserts that its method tests the basis
upon which the witness's answer is formed and it may show that
10 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.), IV, 211-33, sec. 1980 et seq., with cases
cited, gives an illuminating history of the entire doctrine.
11 See footnotes 1, 2, 3.

Le. & Ca. 520, 169 Eng. Rep. 1497 (1865).
Aiken v. People, 183 Ill. 215, 55 N. E. 695 (1899) ; People v. Celmars,
332 I1. 113, 163 N. E. 421 (1928); People v. Page, 365 Ill. 524, 6 N. E.
12

13

(2d) 845 (1937).

14 Though the extent of cross-examination is within the trial court's discretion, Randall v. State, 132 Ind. 539, 32 N. E. 305 (1892) ; Russell v. State,
17 Okla. Crim. Rep. 164, 194 P. 242 (1920), "it is quite impossible definitely
to fix the boundary between pettifoggery on one hand and proper cross-

examination on the other, so as to govern all cases with exactness," State v.

Bateham, 94 Ore. 524, 186 P. 5 (1919).
15 Brindisi v. People, 76 Colo. 244, 230 P. 797 (1924) ; State v. Popa, 56
Mont. 587, 185 P. 1114 (1919).
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he is mistaken. 16 Then it assumes that such rumors have some
probative value; but this is more speculative than morally
certain. As one eminent authority on evidence has stated, "On
the one hand, reputation implies the definite and final formation
of opinion by the community; while rumor implies merely a report that is not yet finally credited."1 7 If it is feared that the
witness has no basis for his testimony, then it appears more
expedient to make the qualifications of character witnesses more
rigorous.
Furthermore, the majority doctrine affords the prosecution
a strategic position which appears unfair. The defendant's
proof is limited to that trait involved, but the prosecution may
propound all sorts' 8 of rumors which the accused can neither
explain nor deny on the ground that collateral issues cannot
be raised. 19 Such action has been justified on the ground that
the accused assumes the risk of such probes by exercising his
privilege, 20 and it appears novel to hinge admissibility upon
such a reason. At first the accused is given the privilege of
proving his good character, and when the credibility of his character witnesses is attacked by reference to rumors of his misconduct, it is presumed that the prosecutor acted in good faith 2 1 and
that the defendant was not prejudiced.2 2 The effect is to render
16 Smith v. State, 22 Ariz. 229, 196 P. 420 (1921) ; Clark v. United
States, 57 App. D. C. 335, 23 F. (2d) 756 (1927) ; Spalitto v. United States,
39 F. (2d) 782 (1930).
17 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) III, 360, sec. 1611.
18 Some courts hold that the cross-examination must be limited to acts
involving the particular trait of character at issue, State v. Holbrook, 98
Ore. 81, 192 P. 640 (1920); State v. Bell, 206 Iowa 816, 221 N. W. 521
(1928). This restriction appears to make the proof partake more of the
nature of a rebuttal of the accused's good character rather than impeachment
of his character witnesses.
19 Hollingsworth v. State, 53 Ark. 387, 14 S. W. 1 (1890); People v.
Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 229 (1830), at p. 257.
20 State v. Shull, 131 Ore. 224, 282 P. 237 (1929); State v. Crow, 107
Mo. 341, 17 S. W. 745 (1891).
21 Smith v. State, 22 Ariz. 229, 196 P. 420 (1921); State v. Moss, 185
Iowa 158, 168 N. W. 164 (1918) ; Kelly v. State, 17 Ala. App. 577, 88 So.
180 (1920).
22 State v. Shull, 131 Ore. 224, 282 P. 237 (1929).
However, State v.
Jones, 48 Mont. 505, 139 P. 441 (1914), intimates that if the form of question
is obnoxious to rule against particular facts, a mere asking of the question
is prejudicial and grounds for reversible error. This appears to be an
adaptation of the "Exchequer heresy," taken from Crease v. Barrett, 1
C. M. & R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353-an error of ruling creates per se for
the excepting and defeated party a right to a new trial. The doctrine obtained
a strong foothold in America, though the courts are gradually repudiating it.
See Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) I, 201, sec. 21. Illinois appears inconsistent. In Jennings v. People, 189 Ill. 320, 59 N. E. 515 (1901), the court
said, even though the rumor questions were improper, as the answers were
"no," the result was favorable rather than prejudicial to the accused. How-
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his privilege nugatory unless he can affirmatively and clearly
prove prejudice, and this cannot be done easily in the average
case.
The perversion of the logical method, adopted in Illinois,
that of limiting both sides to general reputation only, has perhaps made the use of character evidence unsatisfactory. If so,
corrective measures are readily available. If the hearing tends to
be a farce, exclude character evidence for that purpose entirely
or else make the preliminary qualifications for the character
witnesses more rigorous. But in all fairness, both sides should
be confined to the same methods and within the same limits.
R. F. OLsoN
DIVORCE -

CONDONATION -

APPLICABILITY TO DIVORCE ON

GROUND OP VOLUNTARY SEPARATION-The proposed new amendment' to the Illinois Divorce Act 2 which was recently discussed
in the columns of this Review,3 authorizes the granting of a
divorce upon the application of either party, where the parties
have been living separate and apart for a period of two years.
Under a similar statute in Rhode Island 4 the recent case of Reilly
v. Reilly 5 arose presenting the question of whether cohabitation of
the parties during the statutory period would bar the action, or
whether it would be considered as a condonation with its theory of
conditional forgiveness, so that the subsequent separation would
revive the former and the two periods would be added so as to
Ate
enllil the stattnu reqiDrement. Tecor usaind... t
missal of the bill as the wife had proven that the parties had
cohabited several times during the ten year period required by
the Rhode Island statute. It was held that the doctrine of condonation was inapplicable and that the parties must not only
live separate and apart but that all of the ordinary relations
ever, most the Illinois cases under footnotes 1, 2, 3, were reversed either on
the ground that the evidence was inadmissible or that the evidence improperly
admitted created a prejudice against the accused in the minds of the jury.
1 Senate Bill 179.
2 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 40.
3 Win. F. Zacharias, "Suggested Divorce Reforms for Illinois," 15
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 113 (1937).
4 Gen. Laws of Rhode Island (1923),

Ch. 291, sec. 3. "Whenever in the
trial of any petition for divorce from the bonds of marriage it shall be
alleged in the petition that the parties have lived separate and apart from
each other for the space of at least ten years, the court may in its discretion
enter a decree divorcing the parties from the bond of marriage, and may

make provision for alimony."
5 190 A. 476 (R. I., 1937).
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between husband and wife must be discontinued during that
period.
As statutes containing like grounds for divorce appear in relatively few states, 6 no other case presenting the same question is
to be found. But courts have considered analogous cases where
divorces were sought on the ground of a desertion which had continued for a specified length of time. In these cases, by the
weight of authority,7 cohabitation during the period of desertion or abandonment bars the action, and a subsequent desertion8
does not revive the former so that the two periods may be tacked.
There are, however, some cases that apparently apply the law of
condonation with its theory of conditional forgiveness, but upon
examination they are found to be decided upon the factual question of the continuity of period of desertion. They are cases in
which the deserted spouse visits the deserting spouse for the
purpose of effecting a reconciliation, the parties cohabit for a
brief period, but the deserting party does not return. Instead
of applying the law of condonation to this type of case, the courts
have held that the desertion is continuous because the deserting
spouse never brought the desertion to an end.
Among these cases is the early Illinois case of Kennedy v.
Kennedy,9 where the deserted husband visited his deserting wife
in her brother's home for two days for the purpose of inducing
her to return. The Supreme Court in allowing his bill for divorce said, "It can not be inferred from that single act, nor is
there any evidence to show that she agreed or intended to permanently resume their marriage relations ....
Had she gone to
his house and they had so cohabited, then there would have been
6 ARIZONA,

Session Laws (1931),

Ch. 12;

KENTUCKY,

Baldwin's 1936

Rev. St., Ch.66, sec. 2117; NEVADA, Laws of 1931, Ch. 111; LOUISIANA, Gen.
St. (1932), Tit. 17, Ch. 4, sec. 2202; NEW HAMPSHIRE, P. L. 1926, Ch. 287,
sec. 6; NORTH CAROLINA, Code of 1935, Ch. 30, sec. 1658-1658a; TEXAS,

Vernon's Ann. St. (1926), Vol. 13, Tit. 75, Ch. 4, Art. 4629; WASHINGTON,
Remington's Rev. St. (1932), Ch. 12, sec. 982; WISCONSIN, Gen. St. (1929),
sec. 247.07.
7 Reed v. Reed, 64 Ark. 611, 37 S. W. 230 (1896) ; Burk v. Burk, 21
W. Va. 445 (1883) ; Phelan v. Phelan, 135 Il1. 445, 25 N. E. 751 (1890) ;
Gaillard v. Gaillard, 23 Miss. 152 (1851); LaFlamme v. LaFlamme, 210
Mass. 156, 96 N. E. 62, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1133 (1911) ; Tracey v. Tracey,
43 A. 713 (N. J. Eq., 1899) ; Trussell v. Trussell, 116 Pa. Sup. 592, 177 A.
215 (1935).
8 "Unlike cruel and barbarous treatment and indignities to the person
alleged acts of desertion can not be tacked onto alleged prior desertions, if
they are broken or separated by the parties living together in the family
relation, however brief such period may be." Trussell v. Trussell, 116 Pa.
Sup. 592, 177 A. 215 (1935) ; Mikecz v. Mikecz, 95 N. J. Eq. 39, 122 A. 695

(1923).

9 87 I1. 250 (1877).
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entirely a different question presented. . . We are of opinion
. .that the continuity of the time was not interrupted ...."10
While the holding in the Kennedy case has found favor in
other jurisdictions," it was criticized in the West Virginia case
of Burk v. Burk12 as being wrong in principle and dangerous to
good morals. Where the facts show that the parties have frequently cohabited during the period of desertion, as in the Burk
case, the Illinois court also holds that the period is interrupted,
as it did in Phelan v. Phelan.18 Massachusetts declined to adopt
the reasoning of the Kennedy case and held that such conduct
puts an end to the desertion saying, "It can not be said that the
husband's conduct in resuming matrimonial relations with his
wife was merely a condonation or conditional forgiveness of her
prior misconduct.... ",14
In addition to this factual inconsistency of a desertion continuing while the parties have cohabited (which the Kennedy
case rationalizes with a plausible argument) it has been held
that condonation can not apply to desertion cases, 15 as there
is not in existence at the time a cause for divorce which may be
enforced ;16 and that the statute overrides the unwritten law of
17
condonation in desertion cases.
From a review of these cases and the fact that the proposed
amendment specifically states that the parties "have been living
separate and apart 8 without cohabitation with each other for a
period of two years consecutively, immediately before the filing
of a complaint for divorce hereunder, and shall then so be living
separate and apart . . ." it appears that there will be no room
for the application of the doctrine of condonation to cases arising
*

10 Id., p. 254.

11 Danforth v. Danforth, 88 Me. 120, 33 A. 781, 31 L. R. A. 608 (1895);
Dickerson v. Dickerson, 207 S.W. 941 (Tex. Civ. App., 1918).
12 21 W. Va. 445 (1883).
13 135 Ill. 445, 25 N. E. 751 (1890).
14 In LaFlamm v. LaFlamme, 210 Mass. 156, 96 N. E. 62 (1911).
15 Luper v. Luper, 61 Ore. 418, 96 P. 1099 (1908); Trussell v. Trussell,
116 Pa. Sup. 592, 177 A. 215 (1935).
16 In LaFlamme v. LaFlamme, cited in note 14, the cohabitation took
place after the statutory period of desertion had run and the cause of action
complete. The court refused the divorce because the statute also required
that the period of desertion be immediately preceding the filing of the bill.
17 Mikecz v. Mikecz, 95 N. J. Eq. 39, 122 A. 695 (1923).
18 That living in the same house but with a complete cessation of all
matrimonial relations is living separate and apart is held in Stewart v.
Stewart, 45 R. I. 375, 122 A. 778 (1923). For the contrary view that the
separation must be open for the community to observe, and that it should
not be necessary to go into the matrimonial domicile for the evidence, see
Arnoult v. Letten, 155 La. 275, 99 So. 218 (1924) ; Quinn v. Brown, 159 La.
570, 105 So. 624 (1925).
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under it, with the possible exception of where the wife is induced
to cohabit with her husband by his fraud.1 9
F. G. ANGER
EQUITY-CLOUD

ON

TITL,-FORFEITED

LEASE

As CLOUD ON

TITLE.-The Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Hill et al. v.
1550 Hinman Avenue Building Corporation et al.1 recently
held that a ninety-nine year lease which had been recorded and,
so far as the record disclosed, was apparently valid, but which
had been forfeited and was therefore invalid as a lease, is not a
cloud on the title of the lessor. To constitute a cloud, it was said,
an instrument must not only be valid on its face, but it must also
affect the record title, irrespective of whether it may affect the
marketability of the title.
In this case, the plaintiff, in 1926, executed to one Feiwell a
ninety-nine year lease on premises located at 1550 uinman Avenue, Evanston, Illinois. Feiwell had the lease recorded and in
1928 assigned his interest therein to one of the present defendants; the assignment was recorded. Later the assignee executed a
mortgage on his interest, which was also recorded and which
never was released of record. In 1929, the lease was further
assigned to the defendant corporation-which will be designated
hereafter as the lessee-and this assignment was recorded. A
trust deed was executed by the lessee which was recorded and
never released of record. Among other undertakings the lessee
covenanted and agreed to construct a building on the leased
premises, to pay rent, to pay the taxes, and to deposit certain
funds to secure the lessors in the performance of the contract
by the lessee. The lessee defaulted in the performance of the
aforementioned covenants and abandoned the premises. The lessors served a notice of default on the lessee and sixty days later
re-entered and took possession of the premises which they now
hold. The lease, the assignments thereof, and the trust deeds are
still apparently valid in so far as the record shows, notwithstanding the forfeiture by the lessee.
It is well to note that a cloud on title, as previously defined
by the Illinois Supreme Court, is "the semblance of a title,
either legal or equitable or a claim of an interest in land appear19 Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 94 N. J. Eq. 29, 118 A. 532 (1922);
Womble v. Womble, 152 S. W. 473 (Tex. Civ. App., 1912).
1 365 Ill. 129, 6 N. E. (2d) 128 (1936). For a comment on this case
as it appeared in 282 Ill.
App. 109 (1935), see 14 CHICAC-KENT REVIEW
189. In the case of Waller v. Wilson, 282 Ill.
App. 418 (1935), the court
removed a lease as a cloud on title; however, the questions raised in the
instant case were not raised in the Waller case.
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ing in some legal form, but which in fact is unfounded, or which
it would be inequitable to enforce. If the claim sought to be removed is valid, and may be enforced, either at law or in equity,
it is not a cloud. "2 This definition is accepted by the text writers 3 and by courts of other jurisdictions. 4 It is submitted that
the definition is sufficiently broad to include the present case,
since the lease apparently gave to the defendants the right to an
interest in the property. In so far as the record discloses, a subsequent purchaser of the lessor's interest would apparently be
buying a law suit, since the lessee might bring an action to regain the possession.
The court based its holding upon the fact that the record
title is "in a state of perfect tranquility" in that the plaintiff's
possession is in no way threatened and, too, a lessee is bound to
admit his lessor's title. In considering this latter point, it may
be noted that the truth of the statement is based upon the
2 Rigdon v. Shirk, 127 Ill. 411, 19 N. E. 698 (1889)
Goodkind v.
Bartlett, 136 Ill.
18, 26 N. E. 387 (1891) ; Reed v. Tyler, 56 Ill.
288 (1870) ;
Brooks v. Kearns, 86 Ill.
547 (1877). The Illinois Supreme Court has held
that a bill will not lie to remove a mere verbal claim or oral assertion of
ownership in property as a cloud upon title. Allott v. American Strawboard
Co., 237 Ill.
55, 86 N. E. 685 (1908); McCarty v. McCarty, 275 Il1. 573,
114 N. E. 322 (1916) ; Trustees of Schools v. Wilson, 334 Ill. 347, 166 N. E.
55, 78 A. L. R. 22 (1929). Where the title claimed is invalid on its face, so
that it can never successfully be maintained, it can never amount to a cloud.
Gage v. Starkweather, 103 Il1. 559 (1882); Roby v. South Park Commissioners, 215 Ill. 200, 74 N. E. 125 (1905).
As was pointed out in 14 CHIcAGo-KENT REvIEw 189, at p. 191, one of
the principal reasons for equity's removing clouds on title is that outstanding

invalid instruments are calculated to affect the marketability of the title of
the one in possession, who is without remedy at law. In the case of Domin
v. Brush, 174 Ga. 32, 161 S. E. 809'(1931), it is pointed out that the general
test is whether the instrument would be sufficient to support a recovery in
ejectment against the party in possession of the land if no evidence was
offered to rebut it. However, the case of Virginia Coal & Iron Co. v. Kelly,
93 Va. 332, 24 S. E. 1020 (1896), suggests that the true test in every case
ought to be whether in fact the outstanding instrument does cloud the title;
that is, does interfere with the free sale or mortgage of it.
3 Walsh on Equity (lst ed. 1930), p. 546, sec. 117 states the reason for
the holding as follows: "The purpose of these actions is to relieve the
plaintiff from invalid claims based on instruments which make his title
doubtful and therefore unmarketable where no adequate remedy at law exists
to correct the situation." See also, Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3rd ed.,
1905), sec. 1397.
4 Ashurst v. McKenzie, 92 Ala. 484, 9 So. 262 (1890) ; McArthur v. Hood
Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N. E. 162 (1915). In the latter case a
restrictive covenant was removed as a cloud because of changed conditions
in the neighborhood. No instrument was canceled and only this provision
was declared invalid.
For cases wherein a conveyance was compelled in order to remove a
cloud, see, Arrington v. Liscom; 34 Cal. 363 (1868) ; Rayner v. Lee, 20 Mich.
384 (1870) ; Tourtelotte v. Pearce, 27 Neb. 57, 42 N. W.-915 (1889).
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existence of a relationship of landlord and tenant, that is, that
there exists a valid lease. However, the court did not hold that
there was a valid lease in existence, instead they held that "there
is a valid instrument evidencing the agreement of the parties."
The query arises as to whether the instrument is valid as a contract or as a conveyance of a right to an interest in land.5 It is
suggested that the instrument is valid as a contract, determining
the rights and liabilities of the parties, but that it is invalid as a
conveyance of a right to an interest in land, and so it is, in this
respect, a cloud on the plaintiff's title and as such should have
been removed. To hold the instrument valid as a conveyance of
a right to an interest in land would be to say that the lessee has
a right to the possession of the premises, since that is all that
the instrument purports to convey to the lessee. Thus it would
seem that the lessee might regain possession by either an action
in ejectment or an action in forcible entry and detainer. 6 But in
this case, since these are possessory actions, they will not lie, because the lessee has forfeited his right to the possession of the
premises, under the instrument, by breaching his covenants.
The court makes much of a provision in the lease to the effect
that after service of notice of default the lessor could re-enter
the premises and expel all occupants, repossessing the buildings
thereon, "without such re-entry working a forfeiture of the
rents to be paid and the covenants of said lease to be performed
during the term of said lease." Such a provision is not uncommon in long-term leases and has been treated as an agreement
for liquidated damages in case of breach. 7 It is suggested that
5 It is apparently well settled that a lease is an instrument of a dual
nature. It is a contract and also a conveyance of a right to an interest in
land. University Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N. E. 790,
(1914), and note, L. R. A. 1915C, 854; Berman v. Shelby, 93 Ark. 472, 125
S. W. 124 (1910); Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co. 50 Neb. 251,
69 N. W. 785 (1897) ; Graves v. Berdan, 26 N. Y. 498 (1863); McMillan
v. Solomon, 42 Ala. 356, 94 Am. Dec. 654 (1868) ; Snavely v. Berman, 143
Md. 75, 121 A. 842 (1923) ; People's Trust Co. v. Schultz Novelty & Sporting Goods Co., 244 N. Y. 14, 154 N. E. 649 (1926). See 10 Ill. Law Rev.
61, 13 Mich. Law Rev. 317; 22 Mich. Law Rev. 171; 28 Harv. L. Rev. 525;
12 Corn. L. Q. 392; Williston on Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936), III, sec. 890.
6 As to the right to bring an action in Forcible Entry and Detainer see
Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 57, § 2. Also, in the case of Allen
v. Webster, 56 Ill. 393 (1870), the court held that the landlord who parted
with his right to the possession could not maintain forcible detainer and that
the lessee who had the immediate right to pQssession could alone bring the
action. As to the right to bring ejectment, see Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats.
(1935), Ch. 45, §§ 3, 4.
7 Feinsot et al. v. Burstein, 138 N. Y. S. 185 (1912). In this case a clause
of the lease provided that, in case the lease was terminated, the landlord
could retain a deposit of $2000 as liquidated damages.
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the rights of the parties, in the instant case, would in no way
have been prejudiced had such been the decision of the court
here, as this would be merely the recognition of the dual character of a lease. In fact, one court has held that although proceedings, under the statute regulating summary proceedings,
terminated the lease and all existing rights thereunder, still it
was competent for the parties to agree that certain obligations
might continue thereafter, such as the covenant for the payment
of rent.8
The fact that there was no allegation in the complaint that the
possession of the lessor was threatened is the other ground of the
court's holding. To require such an allegation in a complaint to
clear cloud on title would appear to be inequitable in that it would
work a hardship on the plaintiff. It is not difficult to conceive of
a state of facts which would ordinarily entitle one to have a
cloud removed from his title and yet where there would be no
threat to his possession. It is well settled that equity will grant
relief to one in possession, to remove an instrument as a cloud
on his title for the reason that the remedy at law is inadequate. 9
Hence, it would seem that whether the possession of the plaintiff
was threatened or not is immaterial since that has nothing to do
with the relief to be granted, that is, the removal of the instrument as a cloud. In the instant case, the plaintiff cannot bring
ejectment or a forcible entry and detainer action, since he already
has possession, therefore his remedy at law is clearly inadequate
and an action in equity is his only relief. The plaintiff's choice
of equitable relief was not without precedent, for courts of other
jurisdictions have removed, as clouds, leases which have become
invalid by reason of subsequent acts of the parties.' 0
8 Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381, 62 N. E. 425 (1902). The court
held as follows: "While it was within their [the lessor's and lessee's] power
to agree that the lessee should continue to pay rent after the premises had
been taken away from him owing to his default, still a covenant to pay, with
no right to enjoy, should be clear and unambiguous as to the event which
calls it into action." Such was the case here. The court, in the instant case,
said that the terms of the lease were unusually clear.
9 Walsh on Equity (1st ed., 1930), p. 546 et seq.
10 See cases to this effect collected in 78 A. L. R. 92. A number of these
cases involve oil and gas leases. It seems that this should make no difference,
however, since the form of the instrument is immaterial. The query always
is whether or not the instrument, which is apparently valid but actually of
no force and effect, clouds the plaintiff's title. Such was the holding in the
case of Wilmore Coal Co. v. Brown, 147 F. 931, 153 F. 143, certiorari denied, 209 U. S. 546, 38 S. Ct. 758, 52 L. Ed. 920 (1906). This case involved
a bill to cancel certain coal leases, executed in 1878 and 1880, as clouds upon
title. The section where the leases were located was, except for farming,
entirely undeveloped at the time the leases were made. There was no railroad into the section and the leases provided that unless one was so built

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

The restrictions now placed on the doctrine by the present case
tend to restrict this remedy to a very narrow and limited
scope, since now an instrument is not a cloud unless it affects the
record title and even then when the plaintiff is in possession, it
would appear that he could not prevail unless he alleged that his
possession was threatened. In this case the lessee's claim undoubtedly affected the marketability of the lessor's title-but
this is now immaterial-and the claim was invalid as a conveyance of a right to an interest in the premises, yet the court held
it is not a cloud on the lessor's title merely because the instrument
is still valid as a contract.
H. N. LINGLE
EVIDENCE
TESTIMONY

AS

HUSBAND AND WIFE - ADMISSIBILITY OF THEIR
TO NON-ACCESS DURING MARRIAGE TO PROVE

ILLEGITIMACY O CamD.-The Supreme Court of Mississippi in
Moore v. Smith,1 considering the question as one of first impression in that state, and not controlled by statute, has decided that
in a case where the paternity of a child begotten during wedlock
is in issue, testimony of the parents as to non-access of the husband during wedlock is admissible.
While admitting the generally accepted rule to be that in such
cases parents may not testify to non-access, the court cited Rex v.
Reading,2 decided by Lord Hardwicke in 1734, to establish the
fact that prior to 1777 such testimony was permitted and stated
that the basis of the present rule lies in Lord Mansfield's dictum
within five years the leases should be null and void. No railroad was ever
built, and lessee for twenty-four years took no steps to mine or develop the
land. The court held that under the facts of the case the leases were invalid
and constituted a cloud upon the title. The court recognized the peculiar
character of mining leases, stating as follows: "According to the law of
Pennsylvania, by which the subject is necessarily governed, the so-called
leases constitute a sale and conveyance of the coals and minerals in place."
Investigation has disclosed, aside from cases involving mining leases, only
the case of Wright v. Davis, 145 Va. 370, 133 S. E. 659 (1926), in which the
court did remove a lease as a cloud on title. In this case a milling company
leased premises with water power rights from a trustee and the beneficial
owners. In deciding the case the court said: "A generation has passed,
several of the original parties are dead, and their plans for developing and
utilizing the water power have all failed. Neither the lessee milling company
nor its successors, the appellants, ever either asserted or claimed any of their
peculiar rights under the lease (which also imposed burdens) or discharged
any of its obligations thereunder. There has been a failure of consideration
to the lessors. What then should a court do? We confess that we know of
nothing better to be done than that which the trial court concluded to do,
and that is to put the parties in the same position which they occupied at
the time they made and expressed their agreement in writing."
1 172 So. 317 (Miss., 1937).
2 Cas. T. Hard. 79, 95 Eng. Rep. 49 (1734).
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in Goodright v. Moss,8 where he said, "As to the time of birth
the father and mother are the most proper witnesses to prove it.
But it is a rule founded in decency, morality and policy that
they shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they have
had no connection and therefore that the offspring is spurious,
more especially the mother who is the offending party. That point
was solemnly decided at the Delegates."
But Rex v. Reading did not decide that the husband or wife
were competent as sole witnesses to prove non-access. On the contrary, it held that they were not-not because of any rule founded
in decency and morality, but because "it must be of very dangerous consequence to lay it down in general that a wife should be a
sufficient sole evidence to bastardize her child, and to discharge
her husband of the burthen of his maintenance." And Hardwicke pointed out that in cases where the wife's statements had
been received, there was already ample evidence by others to
prove the fact of non-access.
The Mississippi court criticizes the rule because it permits the
right of a child not to be bastardized to outweigh the right of
the presumed father not to be charged with the support of a
child not his. The court states further that it is in accord with
Wigmore's opinion that to permit the child to be bastardized by
testimony of parents to non-access should not be considered to
offend decency, morality and policy any more than does their testimony as to lack of a marriage ceremony, birth of the child before marriage, that one party was already married to a third
person, or their declarations as to legitimacy used after their
death, all of which, Wigmore says, have the effect of bastardizing
4
the child.
Although Professor Wigmore may have disposed of Mansfield's dictum that the rule is founded in decency and morality, he
has not shown that it is good policy to permit married persons,
by self-serving statements, to put the support of their legitimate
children on third persons. The rule does not forbid the wife
to testify to her intercourse with a third person, "by reason of
the nature of the fact, which is usually carried on with such
secrecy that it will admit of no other evidence.' " But such testimony would not alone prove the latter's fatherhood. Protection
to the husband against liability to support a child not his is accomplished by admitting testimony as to non-access by others
3 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777).
4 Wigmore on Evidence (2d. ed.), sec. 2064.
5 Rex. v. Reading, Cas. T. Hard. 79 at. p. 82, 95 Eng. Rep. 49 at p. 51
(1734).
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than the presumed parents. And the fact of such separation
would not likely be so secret as to permit of no evidence but the
statements of the parties themselves.
Whether the rule that husband and wife may not testify to nonaccess during wedlock is considered to date from Lord Mansfield's dictum in 1777, or whether it existed earlier, it has been
consistently followed by the English courts. Indeed, in 1879,
Grove, J., said that a decision was hardly needed to show that
such evidence was inadmissible at common law, 6 and it is English law today. 7 The American courts have followed it almost
without exception; it is law in Illinois.5
L. WHIDDEN
EXECUTORS

AND

ADMINISTRATORS--NEGLIGENCE-LABILITY

OF

EXECUTOR FOR LOSS BY REASON OF FAILURE TO SELL STOCKS ON A

the case of Busby v. First National Bank
of Chicago' the Illinois courts have for the first time been confronted with one of the so-called "depression" cases, involving
the question as to whether or not an executor is liable to a surcharge for failing to sell securities on a falling market. The Appellate Court, upon the facts involved, reversed the circuit court
and allowed the surcharge, stating that although the court might
take judicial notice of the depression since 1929, such depression
did not give "any immunity bath to imprudent and negligent
executors."12
Briefly, the facts of the instant case are as follows: Leonard A.
Busby died September 9, 1930, leaving his widow and two minor
children surviving him. The decedent's will nominated the
First Union Trust and Savings Bank (an affiliate of, and since
merged with, the defendant bank) as executor and residuary trustee of his estate which consisted chiefly of securities with a market value of approximately $1,450,000, held on marginal accounts by an equity of not over 331/3 per cent. Melvin A. Traylor,
president of both banks, assumed direct control of the estate although he later delegated the same to one of the vice-presidents.
The two investment committees of the bank immediately considered the financial status of the estate and recommended that it
be liquidated at the earliest possible moment, and two lists of
FALLING MARKET.-In

6 Nottingham Guardians v. Tomkinson, L. R. 4 C. P. D. 343 (1879).
7 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed.), II, 562, § 772 (1931).
8 People ex rel. Cullison v. Dile, 347 Ill.
23, 179 N. E. 93 (1931).
1 288 Ill. App. 500, 6 N. E. (2d) 451 (1937). Appeal denied, June 16,
1937.
2 Ibid. See also In re Stump's Estate, 274 N. Y. S. 466 (1934) ; In re
Winburn's Estate, 249 N. Y. S.758 (1931).
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the securities were drawn up by the bank experts: List A designating about $920,000 worth of stocks that should be sold immediately because of their speculative nature, and the remainder
in List B as possible to hold although only slightly less speculative. Mrs. Busby was called in and asked to sign a consent to
the sale, which she did. At this time, the market was declining
at a rate which would wipe out the equity of the estate in ten or
twelve days, but it would have been possible to have disposed
of the stock. Despite the investment department's advice, the
defendant bank, on instructions from Mr. Traylor, paid the
balance due to the brokers, pledging the securities to themselves
as collateral for the loan. This collateral was objected to as insufficient by the senior vice-president of the bank and eventually
all assets of the estate, including approximately $150,000 worth
of unpledged securities, were pledged to the First National
Bank so that the entire estate was just an equity in pledged
securities. During the following year, the decline in the market
wiped out all the equity leaving the estate insolvent. Neither the
allowed claims nor the specific legacies were paid by the executor.
The plaintiffs in this action seek to surcharge the executors for
the depreciation in the market value of the securities retained in
1932 as compared with their market value September 23, 1930,
an amount of approximately $400,000.
The executor insisted that the test of its conduct is the exercise
of that degree of skill and diligence which an ordinarily prudent
man bestows on his own similar private affairs as laid don,,- by
the Supreme Court in Christy v. Christy, but the court overruled
this contention on the ground that each case of this class is sui
generis and pointed out that the fact that ordinarily prudent
men in the conduct of their own private affairs might speculate
with their own money surely cannot be used as a standard by
which to measure a fiduciary's duty of care owed to his ward, and
that the Supreme Court has, under other circumstances, held
it was the duty of an executor to use "that degree of reasonable
diligence ordinarily employed in like business affairs by men of
common prudence." 4 The court considers that the defendant
in the instant case held itself forth as being especially qualified
to administer estates and that, although its good faith is not
3 225 Ill.
547, 80 N. E. 242 (1907). See also Christy v. McBride, 1 Scam.
75 (1832) ; Rowen v. Kirkpatrick, 14 Ill.
1 (1852).
4 In re Estate of Corrington, 124 Il1. 363, 16 N. E. 252 (1888); Wadsworth v. Connell, 104 Il. 369 (1882); Whitney v. Peddicord, 63 Ill.
249
(1872); Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 I1. 86,
95 N. E. 59 (1911).
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questioned, that cannot exonerate it from liability for its own
negligence.
Although the majority of the cases in other jurisdictions have
held against the allowance of a surcharge, the court in the instant
case is not without some authority for its decision. The New
Jersey court in In re Westfield Trust Company" held the executor was liable under somewhat similar circumstances, although the
decision was later reversed 6 because of the terms of the will which
were interpreted as directing the executors to hold the stock.
In two cases7 the New York courts have held the executors guilty
of gross negligence where their primary duty was to reduce the
estate to cash for distribution.
New York,8 Connecticut, 9 Pennsylvania, 0 New Jersey,1 ' California,12 and Kentucky' 3 have refused to hold executors liable
where the loss was incurred as in the instant case. However, as
the Appellate Court points out, in none of these are the facts relied upon by the executor at all comparable to the situation in the
Busby estate. In the leading case in New York, 14 dealing with a
previous depression, the securities held were fully paid for
and the will indicated that the testator definitely desired them
to be held for at least two years. The estate itself was in strong
financial condition. This substantial distinction in fact may be
5 115 N. J.Eq. 611, 172 A. 212 (1934).
117 N. J. Eq. 429, 176 A. 101 (1935).
In re Frame's Estate, 284 N. Y. S. 153 (1935), rev'g 274 N. Y. S. 420
(1934). See also Note, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1002; In re Junkersfeld's Estate,
279 N. Y. S. 481 (1935), revg 269 N. Y. S. 514 (1931).
8 In re DeWinter's Will, 276 N. Y. S. 576 (1934) ; In re Balfe's Estate,
8

7

274 N. Y. S. 284 (1934) ; In re Andrew's Estate, 265 N. Y. S. 386 (1933) ;
In re McKee's Estate, 265 N. Y. S. 47 (1933) ; In re McCafferty's Will,
264 N. Y. S. 38 (1933) ; In re Booth's Estate, 264 N. Y. S. 773 (1933) ; In
re Beadleston's Estate, 262 N. Y. S. 507 (1933) ; In re Disbrow's Estate, 261
N. Y. S. 635 (1932) ; In re Kent's Estate, 261 N. Y. S. 698 (1932) ; In re
Sprong's Estate, 259 N. Y. S. 77 (1932) ; In re Pratt's Estate, 257 N. Y. S.
226 (1932) ; In re Parson's Estate, 257 N. Y. S. 339 (1932) ; In re Chave's
Estate, 257 N. Y. S. 641 (1932) ; In re Winburn's Estate, 249 N. Y. S. 758
(1931) ; In re Lazar's Estate, 247 N. Y. S. 230 (1931).
9 Peck v. Searle, 117 Conn. 573, 169 A. 602 (1933).
10 In re Jones' Estate, 314 Pa. 93, 171 A. 265 (1934) ; In re Dickinson's
Estate, 318 Pa. 561, 179 A. 443 (1935).
11 In re Megargee's Estate, 117 N. J. Eq. 347, 175 A. 808 (1934); In re
Pettigrew's Estate, 115 N. J. Eq. 401, 171 A. 152 (1934) ; People's National
Bank and Trust Co. v. Bichler, 115 N. J. Eq. 617, 172 A. 207 (1934) ; Harris
v. Guarantee Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 602, 172 A. 209 (1934).
12 In re Kent's Estate, 50 P. (2d) 457 (Cal. App., 1935).
13 Stuber v. Snyder's Committee, 261 Ky. 338, 87 S. W. (2d) 614 (1935).
14 In re Weston's Estate, 91 N. Y. 502 (1883).
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noted in all the cases cited by the defendants in the instant case.
In not one of them was the executor urged to liquidate the estate.
On the other hand, nearly all of the New York cases are comparable to In re McCafferty's Wil 15 where the executors received
advice that "it was thought anybody that liquidated securities
which they owned outright was very foolish." In all of these
foreign jurisdictions the stocks were of high grade and of inherently sound corporations. In no instance is there a case where
the loss sustained was more than a paper loss; the estates retained
the securities and no debts or legacies remained unpaid. The
executors were not faced, as were the defendants, with the necessity of realizing cash from the assets. In only three cases, among
those considered by other courts, were the stocks not owned outright, and those three present different aspects than the instant
case. In In re McKee's Estate,16 only 4,000 out of 18,000 shares
were pledged and those were held under adequate security, and
the executor was advised by supposedly competent authority not
to sell. In In re Lazar's Estate, 7 the stocks were held upon a
margin of 80 per cent, and in Peck v. Searle,'8 the court absolved
the executor by reason of the fact that he had taken over the
stocks from the brokers only after petitioning and gaining the approval of the probate court to make such a move.
Hence, it may be seen that the Illinois decision is not necessarily
a contradiction of the decisions of other courts that have refused
to surcharge the executor, and it does not follow therefrom that
the Illinois court would, upon a state of facts similar to those in
other jurisdictions, hold the executor liable. It may well be noticed, however, that the court says that no cited case presents the
situation "where a corporate fiduciary. .. disregarded the recommendation of its investment committee to liquidate a lien indebtedness promptly. Neither do any of the cited cases present the
situation where a corporate fiduciary determined on a program of
immediate liquidation ...

received the consent of the beneficiary

thereto and then deliberately failed to carry out that program."1 9
Such a statement tends to reflect the inference that the court is
holding the defendants, as a corporate fiduciary, to a higher degree
of care than it might insist upon from an individual in a like situation. This trend in the law has been recently commented on by
15 264 N. Y. S. 38 (1933).
16 265 N. Y. S. 47 (1933).
17 247 N. Y. S. 230 (1930).
18 117 Conn. 573, 169 A. 602 (1933).
19 At p. 466.
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Professor A. W. Scott,20 although it has not as yet received any
2
direct judicial approval. 1
G. 0. HEBEL
GARNISHMENT-IMMUNITY
NISHMENT

OF A

GOVERNMENT

AGENCY-GAR-

LIABILITY OF HOLC.-A most interesting question which

is being presented to the various courts today is whether the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation is subject to garnishment proceedings.
Within the last year widely differing opinions have been reported
from the Supreme Courts of three different states. A review and
comparison of the cases dealing with this problem is both engaging
and profitable.
In order, the Appellate Court of Ohio (March, 1936), the Supreme Court of Tennessee (July, 1936, opinion designated for
publication January 12, 1937), and the Supreme Court of -Nebraska (March, 1937) have considered this proposition. Because
the Tennessee tribunal reached a different conclusion from the
other two, it may be well to discuss that decision first. The case
was that of Home Owners' Loan Corporationv. Hardie & Caudle,'
wherein the court held that the HOLC is that type of government
instrumentality which is not subject to garnishment. The plaintiffs, Hardie and Caudle, had recovered a judgment against one
O'Rear, an employee of the corporation. The execution which issued against O'Rear was levied by garnishment upon the defendant. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
The court decided that the HOLC was that type of governmental
agency which is ordinarily immune from garnishment proceedings
and that here the sovereign had not stepped into the role of a commercial adventurer and waived its immunity. 2 It also held that,
in the Home Owners' Loan Act 3 authorizing the creation of the
defendant corporation, Congress had neither expressly nor impliedly subjected the defendant to garnishment. The court
based this holding on its construction of the statute which reads
"The Board [meaning the Federal Home Loan Bank Board] is
hereby authorized and directed to create a corporation to be
20 Fifty Years of Trusts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 60 (1936).
21 It is of interest to note that the present value of the stocks held has

increased to such an extent that they will more than cover the amount with
which the executor is surcharged.
1 100 S. W. (2d) 238 (Tenn., 1936).
2 Baird v. Rogers, 95 Tenn. 492, 32 S. W. 630 (1895) ; Board of Directors
v. Bodkin, 108 Tenn. 700, 69 S. W. 270 (1902) ; Dickens v. Bransford Realty
Co., 141 Tenn. 387, 210 S. W. 644 (1919).
3 Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, U. S. C. A., Tit. 12, §,1463, p. 985,
Gen. Code, §§ 11828 et seq.
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known as the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, which shall be an
instrumentality of the United States, which shall have authority
to sue and to be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction, Federal or State ...."4
The Tennessee tribunal distinguished the case from that of
Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Priddy 5 for the reason that
the Federal Land Bank Act is worded broadly "to sue and be
sued ...as fully as natural persons. "0 The court pointed out
that, unlike the Federal Land Bank, no stock of the HOLC is
issued to private individuals, that all funds are in the custody
and control of the Treasurer of the United States, and that salaries of employees are payable by warrant on the United States
Treasury. The opinion concluded by holding that garnishment
process could not reach funds in the Treasury of the United
States and that none elsewhere were shown to be available.
An interesting contrast to this Tennessee opinion is furnished
by a decision of the Appellate Court of Ohio7 handed down early
last year. The case arose upon the same fact, but the main issue
was raised by the defendant's motion to quash service of process
on the ground that it was a government agency and not subject to
garnishment. The Ohio court reached entirely different conclusions on a number of points involved. It decided that the wording of the Home Owners' Loan Act was such as to show a congressional intent to strip the corporation of the rights and immunities
of a sovereign power in relation to the institution of suits by or
against it.8 It held that the business in which the defendant corporation was engaged-that of loaning money and refinancing
mortgages on real estate security-was such as had theretofore
been conducted by private persons and corporations, and that
the activities of the defendant were in the nature of a commercial
venture.9 The court further reasoned that although the underIbid.
295 U. S.229, 55 S.Ct. 705, 79 L. Ed. 1408 (1935). In this case the
United States Supreme Court held that Congress intended to subject the
bank to attachment process at least insofar as it would not directly interfere
with any function of the bank as a Federal instrumentality.
6 Federal Farm Loan Act, U. S. C. A., Tit. 12. § 676, p. 806.
7 Gill v. Reese, 53 Ohio App. 134, 4 N. E. (2d) 273 (1936).
s U. S. C. A., Tit. 12, § 1463, p. 985. Section 7 of the articles of the HOLC
provides: "Said corporation shall have power to sue and shall be subject to
suit as other corporations, and shall have the usual powers and immunities
of corporations of the United States."
9 When the United States enters a commercial business, it abandons its
sovereignty and is treated like any other corporation. Salas v. United States,
234 F. 842 (1916) ; 2 Rose's Notes 180; White v. Nashville and N. W.
Railroad Co., 54 Tenn. 518 (1872); Fields v. Creditors of Wheatley, 33
Tenn. 351 (1853).
4

5
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taking was a public enterprise to handle a particular emergency,
yet Congress had here selected as the instrument for executing
the necessary acts a private corporation rather than a government
agency.' 0 The Ohio judge pointed out that under decisions of
the United States Supreme Court a corporation organized to act
as a government agent, all the stock of which was owned by the
United States, and having the right of eminent domain, was nevertheless subject to garnishment where there was no statutory provision to the contrary." The conclusion reached was that a motion to quash garnishment proceedings would not lie, because the
corporation must be regarded as a private corporation even
though upon an answer being filed it should later develop that
the corporation might partake of the character of a sovereign.12
They also refused to consider the question of reaching the funds of
the defendant in the hands of the Treasurer of the United States
upon the same grounds.
The most recent decision involving this same problem was
handed down by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.'8 They regarded as the really vital issue the question of whether the HOLC
was engaged in a governmental function at the time of the
garnishment proceedings. Conceding the existence of an unusual emergency, they nevertheless held that the corporation was
acting in a commerial role in that it was loaning money and refinancing mortgages on real estate security which it might eventually come to own in its proprietary capacity. Consequently, in
the opinion of the Nebraska court, the immunity of the sovereign
did not extend to the corporate agency which Congress had selected for the accomplishment of its purpose.
The Tennessee decision apparently cannot be reconciled with
the Ohio and Nebraska holdings. It seems that a kindly disposition on the part of the Tennessee court toward government agencies resulted in a rather unusual construction of the statute. The
10 United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1,
48 S. Ct. 12, 72 L. Ed. 131 (1927).
11 Although the Emergency Fleet Corporation possessed the right of
eminent domain and all its stock was owned by the United States, the corporation was nevertheless held subject to garnishment. Haines v. Lone Star
Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110 A. 788 (1920). As regards ownership
of stock by the sovereign, also see Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9
Wheat. 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 (1824) ; Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank
of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. Ed. 244 (1824) ; Huntingdon, C. & I. Turnpike Co. v. Wallace, 8 Watts (48 Pa.) 316 (1839) ; Seymour v. Milford
& Chilicothe Turnpike Road Co., 10 Ohio 477 (1841).
12 Commonwealth Finance Corporation v. Landis, 261 F. 440 (1919).
18

Central Market, Inc. v. King (Home Owners' Loan Corporation,

Garnishee), 272 N. W. 244 (Neb., 1937).
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courts of most jurisdictions can be expected to follow Ohio and
Nebraska in subjecting the Home Owners' Loan Corporation to
garnishment process.
H. WiL
INTERNAL REVENUE-ASSESSMENT--VHETHER MORTGAGEE WHO
ACQUIRES

THE MORTGAGED

PROPERTY

AT A

FORECLOSURE

SALE

REALIZES TAXABLE INCOME ALTHOUGH THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY Is LESS THAN THE LOAN.-In a recent decision, Helvering

v. Midland Mutual Life Insurance Company,' the United States
Supreme Court held that a mortgagee who schedules his income
on the cash basis, and who bids in the mortgaged property at the
foreclosure sale for the principal of the loan and the accrued
interest, realizes income to the extent of the interest. In this
case the taxpayer, an insurance company, bid the full amount. It
was the only bidder at the sale and the value of the property did
not enter into the determination of the amount of the bid, since
the company had issued general instructions to its representatives
to bid in all cases a sum sufficient to insure it against loss in the
event of redemption. The property was entered in the real
estate account at an amount equaling the loan and foreclosure
costs. The unpaid interest was not taken up in the company's
books or shown in its financial statements.
The arguments of the court in support of this holding were
that income may be realized though paid by a credit, that since
the mortgagor is entitled to a deduction the same as if he had paid
the interest, a fortiori the mortgagee realizes income, and that
administrative convenience required the result reached. To the
contention of the taxpayer that a decision in favor of the Government would be inconsistent with the rule stated in Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,2 that the mortgagee is entitled to have "the mortgaged property devoted primarily to the
satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of the proceeds of
a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself," the
court said that the taxpayer had at the sale an election either to
bid or not to bid, and having elected to bid, it was bound thereby.
Deferring to the Supreme Court as profoundly as the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 3 (which overruled the

Board of Tax Appeals decision and the earlier case 4 which were
1 81 L. Ed. 375 (1937).
2 295 U. S. 555, 79 L. Ed. 1593 (1935), at p. 1607.
3 Midland Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F. (2d) 629
(1936).
4 National Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 1000 (1933),
cert. den. 291 U. S. 683, 54 S. Ct. 560, 78 L. Ed. 1070 (1933); Missouri
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to the same effect) deferred to the courts which had previously
considered the problem, the writer submits that the reasoning
of the Supreme Court is fallacious. Since the doctrine of "constructive receipt" is now well established with respect to income
tax law there can be no question but that the court's major
premise, that income may be realized although payment is made
by means of a credit, is correct. It is the minor premises of the
court which are erroneous.
The first of these is that credit was given for the interest. In
a loose sense the mortgagee did give the mortgagor a credit, since
the latter's obligation was discharged. From a strictly legal
standpoint, however, it was a discharge that the mortgagor received and not a credit. The effect of bankruptcy clearly illustrates that legally at least a discharge is not always the equivalent of a credit. After a discharge in bankruptcy, the bankrupt
does in a loose sense get credit for his obligations, but no court
would ever say that therefore the creditors realize income. The
mortgage case and the bankruptcy case are analogous. The mortgagee like the creditor in bankruptcy takes what he can get in
complete discharge of the debt. The fact that he might have had
a deficiency judgment should make no difference if the judgment
would be uncollectible.
This brings us to the crucial question in the case. Namely,
whether inquiry should be made into the market value of the
property. The court said that it should not, because of administrative convenience and because in "reality" the mortgagee
"valued the protection of the higher redemption price as worth
the discharge of the interest debt for which it might have obtained
a judgment."
The "reality" seems to be, however, that the
mortgagee did not consider a deficiency judgment worth anything and wanted to get as clear a title to the property as it could
under the circumstances. The higher the redemption price, the
better the title, for the happening of the contingency which will
defeat the title thereby becomes more remote. Although administrative convenience serves as a good argument in many income
tax cases, it was hardly appropriate in this case. If the administration of the law "would be seriously burdened" by an "inquiry into the fair market value of the property" in this case,
then Congress itself has seriously burdened the administration
State Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 778 (1934); Prudential Life Insurance Co., 33 B.T.A. 332 (1935); Great Southern Life
Insurance Co., 33 B.T.A. 512 (1935) ; American Central Life Insurance Co.,
30 B.T.A. 1183 (1934) ; Reserve Loan Life Co., 18 B.T.A. 359 (1929).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

of the law by providing that gain or loss is recognized upon the
exchange of property and that the amount realized is the fair
market value of the property. 5 True, the amount bid at a foreclosure sale is evidence of value, but it is hard for one familiar
with the administration of the income tax law to conceive of a
case involving the receipt of property as compensation or in
exchange for other property, in which the Bureau of Internal
Revenue would give such a bid conclusive effect.
This decision applies the doctrine of constructive receipt with
a vengeance, or as stated by Justice McReynolds in a dissenting
opinion, it "requires resort to theory at war with patent facts."6
Or as the Circuit Court of Appeals said: "It is true that the
law invests it [the mortgage lien] with the virtue of currency,
but only for a limited and definite purpose-the purchase of the
mortgaged property. We are unable to see by what alchemy
this baser metal is transmuted into gold through the mere formal7
ities of a foreclosure sale. ''
A complete discussion of this case requires that reference be
made to another line of cases8 to the effect that where the mortgagee acquires the property by direct conveyance rather than
foreclosure, no interest income is realized unless the fair market
value of the property is in excess of the amount of the loan, and
to the case in which the mortgagee bids less than the amount of
the loan, foreclosure costs and interest. Although the Supreme
Court has never had occasion to decide a case involving a direct
conveyance it would appear that decisions cited will stand in
spite of the Midland Mutual Life Insurance Company case. The
reason is obvious. There is not a sale in any sense of the word,
but rather an exchange of the loan for the property.9 Therefore,
gain or loss must be determined on the basis of the fair market
value of the property,' 0 as in any other taxable exchange transaction.
There is no better way to show the weakness of the Midland
Mutual Life Insurance Company case than by comparing the
5 U.S.C.A., Tit. 26, §§ 111(b), 112(a), 1936 Act.
6 Previous to the decision of the Supreme Court, but after the decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the case to the Board of Tax
Appeals, the latter body found that the value of the property was less than
the loan.
7 83 F.(2d) 629 (1936).
s Helvering v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (1935)
Prudential Life Insurance Co., 33 B.T.A. 332 (1935) ; American Central Life
-Insurance Co., 30 B.T.A. 1183 (1934).
9 National Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 1000 (1933).
10 U.S.C.A., Tit. 26, §§ 111(b), 112(a), 1936 Act.

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

"realities" of that case with those of the line of cases concerned
with a direct conveyance. Where the mortgagee acquires the
land by direct conveyance he gets a title as clear as that which
the mortgagor had. However, if he bids the property in at a
foreclosure sale he gets merely a defeasible title because of the
outstanding right of redemption. If he bids the full amount of
the debt and interest and the actual value of the property is less
than the amount of the loan, he is taxed if he gets a defeasible
title, but he is not taxed if he gets the clearest title that he can
through the mortgagor. In other words, by actually receiving
more he legally gets less. Such an anomaly is certainly unjustifiable.
If the mortgagee bids in the property at the foreclosure sale
at a figure which is less than the full amount due, it is difficult
to believe that the Supreme Court would go so far as to hold that
even in such a case he has realized income to the extent of the
accrued interest. The mortgagee has clearly not given the mortgagor credit for the interest, since he has taken a judgment for
the deficiency. In reality, however his position is the same as it
would have been had he bid the full amount due. He has the
property subject to the mortgagor's right of redemption and a
lien against the mortgagor's interest in the property (the right
of redemption) to the extent of the deficiency judgment.
Once more then the Supreme Court has allowed form to control substance, and fiction to control fact, in spite of its statement to the contrary in Eisner v. Macomber.11
G. T.
LocAL

IMPROVEMENTS--MANDAMUS--GENERAL

CHRISTIE
LIABILITY

FOR

DrvnEsioN OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT FuNDs AND RIGHT To CoMPEL
LE
OF TAX FOR PAYMENT.-On the ground that the petitioner

failed to show a clear legal right to the writ, the Illinois Appellate
court refused to issue a mandamus in People ex rel. Anderson v.
Village of Bradley, Kankakee County.1 The writ, which had been
granted by the circuit court, was sought by the assignee of a
contractor who had previously obtained a judgment in assumpsit
against the village in the amount of $54,119.12, which amount
was due for the construction of a sewer in a special assessment
11 "In order . . . that the latter [Sixteenth Amendment] also may have

proper effect, it becomes essential to distinguish what is and what is not 'income,' as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction, as cases arise,
according to truth and substance, without regard to form." 252 U.S. 189, 64
L. Ed. 522 (1919), at p. 528.
1 288 Ill. App. 162, 6 N. E. (2d) 240 (1937).
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district. The village had collected over $300,000 from such district and had wrongfully diverted from such collections approximately $25,000. The petitioner obtained his judgment on the
ground that such diversion rendered the defendant village generally liable and sought, by the mandamus proceedings, to compel
the village to levy a general tax for its payment.
In rendering its decision, the court held that a city is not
liable in the event of a diversion of special assessment funds unless
such funds were diverted to general corporate purposes. Although such a conclusion might be a logical interpretation of the
Local Improvements Act,2 from the cases previously decided in
Illinois, it has not been considered the law in this state. In
Rothschild v. Village of Calumet Park,8 the Supreme Court allowed a judgment against the village where the treasurer preferred some creditors rather than distributing the collected funds
pro-rata among the outstanding bondholders. Other cases in this
and other jurisdictions have held the city generally liable for
any wrongful diversion of special assessment funds. 4 If the
instant case were followed as to the issuance of mandamus on
this ground, it would completely nullify the effect of the judgments issued in these latter cases if the city involved refused to
honor such a judgment.
However, there is no authority that holds the village generally
liable for funds that have not been wrongfully diverted from
special assessment monies even though such have been collected.
The statute 5 may be construed as forbidding such a liability and
previous decisions have consistently held this as a ruling principle
of law.6 In the instant case, the amount of the diversion was
Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 24, §§ 740, 742.
3 350 Ill.
330, 183 N. E. 377 (1932).
4 Conway v. City of Chicago, 237 Ill. 128, 86 N. E. 619 (1908); Price
v. Elgin, 257 Ill. 63, 100 N. E. 133 (1912); Donahue v. Village of La
Grange, 183 Ill. App. 222 (1913) ; Shade v. City of Taylorville, 212 Il1. App.
512 (1919); People ex rel. Decker v. City of Park Ridge, 275 Ill. App.
97 (1934); Bankers Life Co. v. Village of Elmwood, 280 Ill. App. 524
(1935) ; Henning v. City of Casper, 57 P. (2d) 304 (Wyo. 1936) ; Price v.
City of Scranton, 321 Pa. 504, 184 A. 253 (1936) ; Wheeler v. City of
Blackfoot, 45 P. (2d) 298 (Idaho 1935) ; State ex rel. Barnett v. Exchange
Nat. Bank of Tulsa, 172 Okla. 361, 45 P. (2d) 759 (1935) ; New First Nat.
Bank of Colombus v. City of Weiser, 30 Idaho 15, 166 P. 213 (1917) ; Miller v. Hamilton, 233 F. 402 (1916).
5 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 24, § 740, providing that only
property benefited may be subject to special assessment.
6 On the grounds that property outside the district is not liable since
it is not benefited and property inside the district may not be taxed because
such would result in double taxation. See Berman v. Board of Education,
360 Ill. 535, 196 N. E. 464 (1935)_; City of Chicago v. Brede, 218 Ill. 528, 75
2
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only twenty-five thousand dollars while the judgment was issued
for the full amount of the claim--over twice as much as the
alleged diversion. Upon no theory could the judgment be sustained for this full amount, and the Appellate court was undoubtedly correct in that the liability of the village did not extend
thereto.
It must be noticed that the instant case is not an appeal from
the decree of judgment, and, although it does not appear to have
been raised before the court, there is a question as to the right of
the court in mandamus proceedings to go behind the judgment in
rendering their decision. It has frequently been declared in general terms by the federal courts that all defenses relating to the
validity of the claim on which a judgment against a public corporation is based are concluded by the judgment and that the
validity of the claim cannot be litigated in mandamus proceedings to enforce the judgment.7 Although the Illinois courts have
generally held that the court may in its discretion refuse the
writ, even though the petitioner may have a clear legal right
thereto, if the consequences of the writ will not promote substantial justice, 8 such declarations are not authority for a review
of the judgment where the matter is one which has been adjudicated in the assumpsit proceedings, but rather a question of the
validity of the means of payment. On the other hand, in Town
of Lyons v. Cooledge,9 the Supreme Court stated that there was
no power, in mandamus proceedings, to go behind the judgment
and question the sufficiency of the cause of action on which it
was predicated. The Appellate Court followed this decision in
Brown v. Ellis,'0 where, in a mandamus proceeding, the defendant
raised an issue as to the validity of the judgment by presenting a
defense to its merits, and stated: "The case at bar is not one
of collecting a claim that was illegal when made. The legality of
N. E. 1044 (1905); Midland Lumber Co. v. City of Dallas City, 276 Ill.
172, 114 N. E. 580 (1916); Wetherell v. Devine, 116 Ill. 631, 6 N. E. 24
(1886). See also T. M. Cooley on Taxation, (1886), Ch. XX, pp. 628, 629.
7 United States ex rel. Huidekoper v. County Court of Macon County,
99 U. S.584, 25 L. Ed. 331 (1879) ; County Court of Ralls County v. United
States ex rel. Douglass, 105 U. S. 733, 26 L. Ed. 1220 (1882); Hill v.
Scotland County Court, 32 F. 716 (1887) ; Fleming v. Trowsdale, 85 F. 189
(1898). See note, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002.
8 People ex rel. Beardsley v. City of Rock Island, 215 Ill. 488, 74 N. E.
437 (1905) ; People ex rel. Akin v. Bd. of Supervisors of Adams County, 185
Ill. 288, 56 N. E. 1044 (1900); People ex rel. Stettauer v. Olson, 215 IIl.

620, 74 N. E. 785 (1905) ; People ex rel. McCormick v. Western Storage
Co., 287 Ill. 612, 123 N. E. 43 (1919); Hooper v. Rooney, 293 Ill. 370, 127

N. E. 711 (1920).

89 Ill. 529 (1878). See also Durham v. Field, 30 Ill.
App. 540 (1920).
10 219 Ill. App. 540 (1920).
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the claim has been adjudicated. This is a suit for the collection
of a judgment.... It is conclusively settled, by the judgment, that
the claim upon which it was based was a legal and binding obligation. Appellant cannot in this proceeding go behind the judgment and question the sufficiency of the cause of action on which
it was based." Thus it would seem that there is ample authority
in Illinois to justify the conclusion that the Appellate Court in the
instant case could have held that the principle of res judicata applied and refused to consider the defenses interposed to the merits
of the judgment upon which they based their refusal of the writ.
G. 0. HEE
MORTGAGES-FORECLOSURE-FAIRNESS

OF PLAN OF REORGAN-

IZATION IN FORECLOSURE ACTION.-In a case of first impression,

the Supreme Court of Illinois, in The First National Bank of
1
Chicago v. Bryn Mawr Beach Building Corporation,
held that
the courts of this state should and do have jurisdiction to pass
upon reorganization plans in foreclosure suits. In that case, the
trustee had filed a bill to foreclose the lien of the trust deed securing a bond issue of six million dollars. Pursuant to an order
of foreclosure and sale, the property was sold to a representative
of the bondholders' committee for $1,040,225. Having previously
acquired the equity of redemption, the committee representing
more than 80 per cent of the bondholders filed an intervening
petition asking the court to pass upon the fairness of a proposed
reorganization plan. Over the objection of the non-depositing
bondholders, the court approved the plan and confirmed the sale.
Although there are a few early cases 2 where reorganization
plans have been mentioned incidentally, it was not until after
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Northern Pacific Railroad v. Boyd,8 that the parties interested in reorganizations sought to have the plan passed upon by a court
before it was put into operation. The corresponding change of
attitude of the courts is stated in Bethlehem Steel Company v.
1 365 Ill. 409, 6 N. E. (2d) 654 (1937).
2 Walker v. Whelen, 4 Phila. 389 (1862); Wetmore v. St. Paul & Pacific

R. Co., 3 F. 177 (1880).

3 228 U. S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931 (1913). In that case, in spite
of the fact that there was a judicial sale of all of the assets of the old corporation to a new corporation formed by the security holders of the old, a creditor was allowed to enforce his claim against the new company. The plan of
reorganization, which was not passed upon by the court before it was put

into effect, was held to be unfair and a fraud on the creditor as it permitted
the stockholders of the original company to participate in the plan of reorganization without giving the creditor the same right.
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International Combustion Engineering Corporation4 where the
court said, "Until the last twenty years, the courts, in no uncertain terms, expressed the view that they had no concern with
the business of reorganization. Its sole function was, through
receivership and injunction, to hold the assets in statu quo, pending either their sale or liquidation as the interested parties might
determine. In later years, it has been considered as within the
court's jurisdiction to examine the proposed plan and to pass upon
its fairness."
It has been said that where only one class of security holder
is involved, as in the present case, there is not, strictly speaking,
a reorganization, and hence no necessity for passing upon the
fairness of a proposed plan. 5 However, that there is a need for
some judicial supervision in such a case was recognized by Mr.
Justice Baker when he decided the case of Investment Registry
v. Chicago & Milwaukee Electric Railroad Company.6 In that
case, which involved only one class of security holder, he said,
"When such a controversy is on, the chancellor, in our opinion,
not only has the right but owes the duty of being vigilant to see,
on the one hand, that a dissenter be not permitted to create a
maneuvering value in his bonds by opposing confirmation, and,
on the other, that the majority does not use its power, unique in
sales of this class, to oppress a helpless minority."
It is to be noted that the Boyd case and the Investment Registry
case, like all of earlier cases where the courts considered reorganization plans, were in the Federal courts and involved a railroad
corporation. The public interest in keeping such companies in
uninterrupted operation is, of course, a strong argument for the
equity courts to assume jurisdiction. The Federal courts, however, have not limited their jurisdiction to cases involving public
utilities and railroads, but have, as in the Bethlehem Steel case
and others,7 considered reorganization plans for ordinary industrial corporations.
Because of the fact that the first reorganizations were railroads
and because of the preference of litigants to bring this type of
case to the Federal courts,8 few state decisions 9 are to be found.
66 F. (2d) 409 (1933).
Corporate Foreclosures, Receiverships and Reorganizations, John E.
Tracy, (Callaghan & Co. 1929) Section 297, p. 346.
6 212 F. 594 (1913).
7 Graselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 252 F. 456 (1916) ; First
National Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 54 S. Ct. 298 (1933).
8 For a discussion of the advantages of bringing this type of suit in the
Federal courts see section 29, p. 34, Corporate Foreclosures, Receiverships
and Reorganizations (Callaghan & Co. 1929).
9 Moore v. Splitdorf Electric Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 358, 168 A. 741 (1933)
4
5
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In a recent case in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York,' 0 the court stated that while it had no direct power
to consider a reorganization plan, since the action was in equity,
the court should be alert to see that no injustice was done by use
of the court's processes to the parties to the suit or those remotely
interested but represented by one of the parties.
What elements shall be considered by a court in arriving at a
conclusion regarding the fairness of a plan ? In Fearonv. Bankers Trust Company," the fact that the dissenters were permitted
to participate in the plan on the same footing as the proponents,
was held, in and of itself, to indicate that the plan was fair. It
would seem that in addition to the right of all to participate
equally, the price bid at the sale should be considered by the
court in passing upon the plan. It is this price that sets the
amount of cash the minority will receive in case it chooses not to
participate, and determines the amount of money that the majority will have to raise. If this price is too low, the minority
has no real choice, and if it is too high reorganization is made
impossible because of the increased number of non-participants
who have to be paid in cash.
An attempt to compel the minority to accept the securities
offered by the plan in a reorganization by decree 2 was held to
be an unconstitutional impairment of contractual rights in the
case of Wheeler Kelly Hagny Trust Company v. Heskett.18
While the forcing of the minority to accept the plan by confirmation of a low sale price is not open to the same legal objection, the
result is equally undesirable. If price is to be considered in
approving the plan, then the courts should have some control
over it. Since it was recently decided that Illinois courts do not
Chase National Bank v. Clark Henry Corp., 283 N. Y. S. 20 (1935);
Wheeler Kelly Hagny Trust Co. v. Heskett, 141 Kan. 186, 40 P. (2d) 440

(1935).
10 Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp., 263 N. Y. S. 359

(1933).
11 238 F. 83 (1916). "That the plan proposed may be taken advantage of
and participated in by all the bondholders including these exceptants . . .
on the same footing as the majority bondholders, in itself shows that the
plan proposed is fair and equitable, in that it treats alike all parties interested
therein."
12
Ralph F. Colin, "Why an Upset Price? An Argument for Reorganization by Decree," 28 Ill. L. Rev. 225 (1933). For a discussion of the power
of the Federal courts to compel all creditors to accept something other than
cash, see James N. Rosenberg, "Reorganization-The Next Step.," 22 Col. L.
Rev. 14 (1922) ; and for the contrary view, Robert T. Swaine, "Reorganiza-

tion-The Next Step," 22 Col. L. Rev. 121 (1922).
13 141 Kan. 186, 40 P. (2d) 440 (1935).
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have the power to fix an upset price,1 4 this control may be based
upon those cases 15 which hold that the chancellor had broad discretion in confirming or refusing to confirm the sale. Thus,
while the court may not set an upset price before sale, it might
refuse to confirm any sale that did not bring a sufficient price;
for, once the sale has been confirmed it may not be set aside for
inadequacy of price alone, unless the price is so grossly inadequate
as to shock the conscience. 18
As the holding in the instant case is based upon ample precedent in the Federal courts and there is no reason why state
equity courts are or should be more limited, it is legally sound.
With the doubt 17 concerning the courts' power is removed, they
should be able to adjust the rights of the various parties in foreclosures involving large numbers of separate bondholders better
than they could with the inadequate tools of the simple foreclosure proceeding. That equity has great dormant powers which
it uses when the occasion arises is indicated in Graselli Chemical
Company v. Aetna Explosives Company,'8 where the court said,
"In the absence of power created by legislation ... the federal
judges, sitting as courts of equity, have endeavored to secure to
the rights of those interested.., a protection to meet the needs of
the occasion. Changing times, with change in economic needs,
require the courts of equity to mold remedies to meet the conditions with which they have to deal."

F. G.

ANGER

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POLICE POwER-RIGHT OF CITY TO
INSTALL PARKING METERS.-The City of Birmingham, Alabama,

was denied the right to place coin operated parking meters upon
its streets by the Supreme Court of Alabama in the case of City
of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Company.' The court
denied the right of the city to install such meters on the grounds
that the ordinance authorizing such installation deprived com14 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 Ill. 261, 198 N. E. 4 (1935);
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Bamburg, 361 Ill. 269, 198 N. E. 10 (1935).
That the upset price is in theory to protect the minority but in practice has
become a weapon of the majority see Joseph L. Weiner, "Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price," 27 Col. L. Rev. 132 (1927). For a discussion
of these cases see 13 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw 160 and 355 (1935).
15 For example, Robert v. Goodwin, 288 Ill. 561, 123 N. E. 559 (1919).
16 First National Bank v. Bryn Mawr Bldg. Corp., 365 Ill. 409, 6 N. E.
(2d) 654 (1937).
17 Straus v. Anderson, 283 Ill. App. 342 (1935); In re Knickerbocker
Hotel Co., 82 F. (2d) 981 (1936) ; First National Bank v. LaSalle-Wacker
Bldg. Corp., 280 Ill. App. 188 (1935).
18 252 F. 456 (1918).
1 172 So. 114 (1937).

CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

plainant of its property without due process of law and constituted an unauthorized exercise of the taxing power.
The Hood-McPherson Realty Company sought to enjoin the
installation of the meters upon the ground that they constituted
a nuisance as to the public in general and as to the plaintiff in
particular. In holding the parking meters to be a deprivation of
complainant's property without due process of law, the court appears to have rested its decision on the basic premise that such
regulation denied the complainant and its customers free access
to its property. As a general proposition it cannot be doubted
that the owner of property abutting the street has the right to
ingress and egress to and from his lot over and by means of the
adjacent portion of the street.2 It has further been held that the
right of unobstructed accessibility extends to patrons entering
and leaving the premises and who need to stop briefly in the street
in front of the property.3
In the case of Haggenjos v. City of Chicago,4 the Supreme
Court of Illinois held an ordinance absolutely prohibiting parking
in the Chicago central business district to be invalid. In the subsequent case of City of Chicago v. McKinley,5 the same court sustained a new ordinance allowing a parking limit of three minutes
in the same area, as such limit allowed a reasonable time for
alighting for the purpose of entering adjoining property. Illinois
decisions, therefore, indicate that the ordinance might have been
sustained as to the due process clause had it provided a reasonable
time for stoppin- without the necess;t of paying the parking
fee.
The Birmingham ordinance was also held invalid on the ground
that it constituted an unauthorized exercise of the taxing power.
The power to tax for revenue purposes is not included in the
police power of the state, and any attempt to create revenue under
the guise of police regulation will be declared invalid. 6 A license
fee required by an ordinance designed as a police regulation
2 Ritchhart v. Barton, 193 Iowa 271, 186 N. W. 851 (1922); Central
Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Hennen, 90 F. 593 (1898) ; City of Chicago v. Baker,
98 F. 830 (1900); City of Chicago v. Union Building Association, 102 Il.
379, 40 Am. Rep. 598 (1882) ; Sears v. City of Chicago, 247 Ill. 204, 93 N. E.
158 (1910) ; First National Bank of Montgomery v. Tyson, 133 Ala. 459,
32 So. 144 (1902).
3 Longnecker v. Wichita R. & Light Co., 80 Kan. 413, 102 P. 492 (1909);
Hester v. Durham Traction Co., 138 N. C. 288, 50 S. E. 711 (1905).
4 336 Ill. 573, 168 N. E. 661 (1929).
5 344 Ill. 297, 176 N. E. 261 (1931).
6 State ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police Court of City of Bozeman, 68
Mont. 435, 219 P. 810 (1923) ; Berry on Automobiles (3rd ed.), sec. 104;
Viquesney v. Kansas City, 305 Mo. 488, 266 S. W. 700 (1924); Daily v.
City of Owensboro, 257 Ky. 281, 77 S. W. (2d) 939 (1934).
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should not exceed the costs of inspection and supervision occasioned thereby. 7 The city cannot, however, be expected to anticipate the exact cost of such regulation and the exact yield of such
license fee and if the revenues exceed the costs by a reasonable
margin the measure will not thereby be rendered invalid.8 If the
amount of excess revenue is unreasonable, as was apparently the
case here, the ordinance will be held to have exceeded the police
power.
The court further ruled that the parking meters, having been
erected without due authority and constituting a permanent obstruction in the street, were a public nuisance.9 The plaintiff,
having been particularly and specially damaged thereby, was en0
titled to maintain an action for their removal.'
The Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy," recently upheld a similar ordinance of the
city of Miami. In this case the defendant was arrested for parking his automobile in front of a parking meter and failing to deposit the required five-cent coin. The question of due process was
not raised. Although holding the ordinance valid as a lawful
exercise of the police power the court intimated that a different
result would have been obtained if the purpose of the ordinance
had been to raise revenue. The court added that the burden of
proving the unreasonableness of the fee charged was upon the
party asserting such fact, in this case the defendant.
In view of the questions raised, the holding of the Alabama
court in City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPhersonRealty Company
does not appear to be necessarily controlling with regard to ordinances authorizing the installation of parking meters. The questions as to whether the parking meters deny the owner and his
customers access to his property and whether the ordinance constitutes a revenue measure are matters of fact to be determined
in each case by the jury. The decision is interesting, however,
as indicative of the limitations beyond which such ordinances
cannot extend.
J. M. LOCKHART
7 State ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police Court of City of Bozeman, 68
Mont. 435, 219 P. 810 (1923) ; Berry on Automobiles (3rd ed.), sec. 104.
8 City of East St. Louis v. Trustees of Schools, 102 Ill. 489 (1882) ; State
ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police Court of City of Bozeman, 68 Mont. 435,
219 P. 810 (1923) ; Tenney, Chairman, etc. v. Lenz, 16 Wis. 589 (1863).
9 Densmore v. City of Birmingham, 223 Ala. 210, 135 So. 320 (1931).
10 City of Chicago v. Union Bldg. Association, 102 Ill. 379 (1882);

Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 (1882).
11 171 So. 314 (1936).
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MUNICIPAL

FUNDING

CORPORATIONS

-

STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION -

OF EXISTING BONDED INDEBTEDNESS

RE-

AS CONSTITUTING

PAYMENT.-In the case of Tonry v. Board of Levee Commissioners for Orleans Levee District,' the Supreme Court of Louisiana
validated refunding bonds issued by the Orleans Levee Board and
held that the holders of the new bonds were subrogated to all the
rights of the holders of the old bonds, including the right to have
a special one mill tax levied for the payment of principal and
interest on such bonds. In so doing the court disregarded the
strict wording of the statute authorizing the levy of such special
tax and placed a construction upon it which gave expression to
its intendment rather than its literal wording.
In 1928,. the Orleans Levee District issued its bonds to provide
funds to reimburse certain property owners for damages resulting from the voluntary destruction of certain levees below New
Orleans. To provide for the payment of principal and interest
on these bonds a special one mill tax was authorized by the Louisiana legislature. This legislation provided that "when the bonds,
notes or certificates of indebtedness, issued hereunder, shall have
2
'
been paid in full, said tax shall cease to be levied."
A taxpayer contested the issuance of bonds refunding this debt
at a lower rate of interest because the resolution authorizing the
refunding bonds subrogated the new bonds to all the rights of
holders of the old bonds including the right to have a special one
mill tax levied for the servicing of the bonds. The refunding
bonds were sold on the open market and the proceeds used to pay
the old indebtedness, and the plaintiff accordingly asserted that
the payment of the old bonds, from the proceeds of the new bonds,
constituted such payment as was contemplated by the legislative
authorization, and ended the authority of the Levee Board to
levy the aforesaid one mill tax.
In the determination of this question the court was apparently guided by the general rules of statutory construction and
specific holdings with regard to the extension of bonded indebtedness. As a general rule a legislative limitation will be construed
in the broadest sense which will advance the benefit sought and
the words used are given a meaning in accordance with their
usual
4
and customary signification and their fair intendment.
In the present case the taxpayers of the Levee District would
benefit from the reduction in interest resulting from the refund1 171 So. 836 (La. 1937).
2 Act No. 2 of the Extra Session for 1927 of the Louisiana legislature.
8 Spilman v. City of Parkersburg, 35 W. Va. 605, 14 S. E. 279 (1891).
4 Samuels v. City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97, 211 S.W. 567 (1919).
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ing operation and a strict construction of the limitation, enacted
for their benefit, would tend to penalize them. Courts have been
inclined to construe such limitations liberally where a strict construction would tend to prevent the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which the limitation was adopted. 5
In a number of cases involving the extension of existing indebtedness the courts have taken the position that the issuance of
bonds to redeem outstanding bonds or other forms of indebtedness
is not the creation of a new indebtedness but merely a change in
the form of such indebtedness,6 and this doctrine has been applied without distinction between cases involving the exchange of
bonds and cases where refunding bonds
were sold and the pro7
ceeds used to redeem the old bonds.
A case squarely in line with the present case is Blanton v.
Board of County Commissioners" wherein the court stated: "The
mere renewed recognition of a subsisting liability in the issuance
of a new bond declared in the very act which authorizes the issue
'to be a continuation of the liability' resting upon the county cannot upon any sound reasoning be deemed the creation of a new
debt in the sense of falling under the restrictions applicable to
new contracts of indebtedness with the deprivation of the preexistent means of enforcing performance by the levy of the necessary taxes."
It appears, therefore, that the Louisiana court was justified by
precedent and authority in disregarding the strict wording of
the statute and applying a construction which granted rather than
denied the benefit and protection intended.
J. M. LOCKHART
SALES-IMPIJED WARRANTY OF FITNEsS OF FOOD-CONTRACT
LIABIsITY OF RESTAURANT KEEPER FOR SERVING UNFIT FOOD.-

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in the recent case of For&d v.
Waldorf System, Inc.," held that a restaurant keeper who serves
food for immediate consumption on the premises impliedly war5 Levy v. McClellan, 196 N. Y. 178, 89 N. E. 569 (1909) ; Thorn v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore, 154 Md. 273, 141 A. 125 (1928); Hotchkiss v.
Marion, 12 Mont. 218, 29 P. 821 (1892).
6 Poughkeepsie v. Quintard, 136 N. Y. 275, 32 N. E. 764 (1892) ; Independent School District v. Rew, 111 F. 1 (1901) ; Hirt v. Erie, 200 Pa. 223,
49 A. 796 (1901); Vaughn v. Corbin, 217 Ky. 521, 289 S. W. 1104 (1927).
7 Hotchkiss v. Marion, 12 Mont. 218, 29 P. 821 (1892) ; Poughkeepsie v.
Quintard, 136 N. Y. 275, 32 N. E. 764 (1892).
8 101 N. C. 535, 8 S. E. 162 (1888). See also State ex rel. Judd v.
Cooney, 32 P. (2d) 851 (Mont. 1934) ; Board of Commissioners v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 128 F. 817 (1904).
1 188 A. 633 (R. I., 1936), restaurant serving beans containing wood.
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rants the fitness of the food for human consumption, and he is
liable in assumpsit for a breach of this warranty irrespective of
the existence of negligence. This decision adds one more state to
those adhering to this relatively new doctrine.
The earliest American case to impose such a liability on a restaurant keeper was that of Leahy v. Essex,' decided in New York
in 1914. Prior to that time a patron injured by unwholesome
food was limited to an action in tort where it was necessary to
allege and prove actual negligence. 3 But courts were imposing
the harsher rule of liability on an implied warranty to retail merchants who sold food for immediate consumption. 4 The fact that
these two different rules of liability were being imposed on cases
analogous in fact, although distinguishable, was one factor that
led to the same rule being applied to both. 5
Why is not the serving of food by a hotel or restaurant just as
much a sale of the food as where a merchant sells the same kind
of food to be consumed elsewhere ?6 The answer is partially historical and partially factual. In early times the serving of food
was a function of the innkeeper, and resturants as we know them
today were non-existent. The guest at the inn paid a sum which
included his room and food for both himself and horses. Thus
the early English cases hold that the innkeeper or victualer 7 did
not sell but "uttered his provision" and therefore was not a
trader within the meaning of the bankruptcy acts.8
In restaurants where service, music, and entertainment comprise the largest part of the price paid for a dinner, this reasoning might apply even today, for the furnishing of food can still
2 148 N. Y. S. 1063 (1914), restaurant serving unwholesome pie.
The
earlier case of Race v. Krum, 146 N. Y. S. 197 (1914), aff'd 222 N. Y. 410, .
118 N. E. 853 (1918) imposed liability on the implied warranty on a druggist who sold some impure ice cream, manufactured by himself. The court
stated in deciding it, that it must be borne in mind we are not dealing with
a case involving an inn or restaurant keeper. See 27 Yale L. Jour. 1069 for
a discussion of this case.
3 Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 F. 519 (1914).
4 Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N. E. 210 (1898) ; Race v. Krum,
222 N. Y. 410, 118 N. E. 843 (1918); Williston on Sales, I, 480-482, secs.
242-242a.
5 Temple v. Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 182 (1924).
6 "It seems to me idle, in determining the question, to seek analogies derived from implied warranties in sales of goods. In the first place, one is
met at the outset by the legal theory which has long prevailed, that food
furnished by a victualer is not a sale."-Judge Augustus Hand in Valeri v.
Pullman Co., 218 F. 519 (1914).
7 "The analogy between the two cases of an inn-keeper and victualler is

so strong that it cannot be got over."-Lord Mansfield in Saunderson v.
Rowles, 4 Burr. 2064, 98 Eng. Rep. 77 (1767).
8 Newton v. Trigg, 3 Mod. 327, 87 Eng. Rep. 217 (1690) ; Crisp v. Pratt,
Cro. Car. 549, 79 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1635).
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be said to be a service rather than a sale of the food. However,
in the modern restaurants where portions of food are served at
stipulated price per portion, the transaction comes closer to being
a sale. This is especially true in cafeterias and automats where
the price paid is no more for service than is the price set by a
retail store on the goods it sells. Every sale includes an element
of service. Certainly the argument that title does not pass would
have little or no application to this type of restaurant. 9
For the purpose of enforcement of the criminal or tax laws
various states have held the serving of food to be a sale. Thus
the serving of prohibited game is a sale within the game laws ;10
the serving of oleomargarine is a violation of a law prohibiting the
sale of it;11 the serving of food in a hotel restaurant is a sale
within an act imposing a percentage tax, such as an occupational
tax,' 2 on sales. These decisions while not directly in point have
been relied upon to impose the implied warranty doctrine. 18 It
has been stated that before a recovery may be allowed on the implied warranty it is not necessary that there be a sale in fact, but
that a qualified sale' 4 or contractual relation between the parties
will suffice.' 5
Cases allowing a recovery on the implied warranty theory arose
on the following facts: restaurant serving beans containing
stones, 16 hotel serving kidney saute containing a mouse, 17 restaurant serving unfit fish,' 8 restaurant serving spoiled pork,19
restaurant serving unfit chicken,2 0 lunch counter serving spoiled
ham salad, 21 and others.22 In all these cases the one serving the
9

Beale on Innkeepers and Hotels (1906), p. 117, sec. 169.

10 People v. Clair, 221 N. Y. 108, 116 N. E. 868 (1917) ; Commonwealth

v. Phoenix Hotel Co., 157 Ky. 180, 162 S. W. 823 (1914).
11 Commonwealth v. Miller, 131 Pa. 118, 18 A. 938, 6 L. R. A. 633 (1889).
12 The Brevoort Hotel Co. v. Ames, 360 Ill. 485, 196 N. E. 461 (1935).
'3 West v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Sup. Ct. 118, 162 A. 685 (1932).
14 Temple v. Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 182 (1924); Smith v.
Carlos, 215 Mo. App. 488, 247 S. W. 468 (1923).
15 Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5
A. L. R. 1100 (1918). See note 5 A. L. R. 1115.
16 Ibid.
17 Barrington v. Hotel Astor, 171 N. Y. S. 840 (1918).
18 Smith v. Gerrish, 256 Mass. 183, 152 N. E. 318 (1926) ; Temple v.
Keeler, 238 N. Y. 344, 144 N. E. 182 (1924) ; Smith v. Carlos, 215 Mo. App.
488, 247 S. W. 468 (1923).
19 West v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Sup. Ct. 118, 162 A. 685 (1932).
20 Heise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. App. 551, 149 N. E. 182 (1925).
21 Stanfield v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53 P. (2d) 878 (1935).
22 Bork v. Dixson, 115 Minn. 172, 131 N. W. 1078 (1911); Koplin v.
Louis K. Liggett Co., 119 Pa. Sup. Ct. 529, 181 A. 381 (1935). See cases
collected in the following notes: 5 A.L.R. 1115; 35 A.L.R. 921; 50 A.L.R.
231; 98 A.L.R. 687; 104 A.L.R. 1033.
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food had prepared it and was therefore in a position to determine
its fitness.
In the cases where the food dispensed was not prepared by the
server of it, but was purchased from others and was of such a
nature that its unfitness could not be determined without a destruction of the food itself, recovery has been allowed in such
cases as a lunch counter serving deleterious ice cream, 23 a restaurant serving unwholesome frankfurter, 24 a restaurant serving
a roll containing2 6a pebble, 25 a lunch counter serving chow mein
containing glass.

Contrasted with the doctrine of liability on the implied warranty theory is the original common law doctrine that, with but
a few recognized exceptions, there can be no liability where there
is no fault. This doctrine is followed in numerous jurisdictions 27
although the tendency is toward the adoption of the implied warranty theory as in the instant case. It has been urged on the
courts in jurisdictions adhering to the common law theory that
Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act 28 should apply, but such
courts hold that this act was merely declaratory of the common
law and applied only to transactions that were sales at common
29
law.

Public safety and health is of such primary importance that
the application of the implied warranty doctrine can be justified
23
24
25

S. H. Kress & Co. v. Ferguson, 60 S. W. (2d) 817 (Tex. App., 1933).
Greenwood v. John R. Thompson Co., 213 I1. App. 371 (1919).

Cushing v. Rodman, 65 App. D. C. 258, 82 F. (2d) 864, 104 A.L.R. 1023

(193)0
26 Goetten
27
Valeri

v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 683, 59 P. (2d) 142 (1936).
v. Pullman Co., 218 F. 519 (1914), pullman car serving unfit
food; Loucks v. Morely, 39 Cal. App. 570, 170 P. 529 (1919), restaurant
serving unfit rice pudding; Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 A. 533,
L.R.A. 1915B 481, Ann. Cas. 1916D 917, restaurant serving spoiled sweetbreads; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Wilson, 74 F. (2d) 439, 98 A.L.R. 681
(1934), soda fountain serving ice cream containing glass; Horn & Hardart
Baking Co. v. Lieber, 25 F. (2d) 449 (1928), restaurant serving berries
containing a tack; Travis v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 183 Ala. 415, 62 So.
851 (1918), dining car serving unfit food; Rowe v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
28 Ga. App. 151, 113 S. E. 823 (1922), same facts; Nisky v. Childs, 103
N. J. L. 464, 135 A. 805 (1927), restaurant serving spoiled oysters; Kenney
v. Wong, 81 N. H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925), restaurant serving chicken
dressing containing a mouse.
28 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1933), Ch. 1212, § 15 (1): "Where the
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular
purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose."
29 McCarley v. Woods Drugs Inc., 228 Ala. 226, 153 So. 446 (1934)
Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 117 Conn. 128, 167 A. 99 (1933); Loucks v.
Morely, 39 Cal. App. 570, 179 P. 529 (1919).
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on this ground alone. As between the restaurant proprietor and
his patrons, the restaurant keeper is certainly in a better position
to select and examine the quality of food that he serves than his
guests who are obliged to rely upon his skill and reputation.
In Illinois the earlier case of Sheffer v. Willoughby"° (which
has been cited several times in other jurisdictions as authority for
the proposition that there is no implied warranty) was an action
in tort and recovery was denied by the Supreme Court because
of the failure of the plaintiff to prove negligence. The court followed the rule laid down in Weideman v. Keller,31 an appellate
court case which was later reversed by the Supreme Court on
appeal. 3 2 In the later case of Greenwood v. John R. Thompson
Company 8 the Appellate Court refused to sustain a demurrer to
a complaint containing a count on the implied warranty theory.
In the case of The Brevoort Hotel Company v. Ames,34 a tax
case, the Supreme Court held that the serving of food by a hotel
was a sale. In view of these cases, and the trend in other jurisdictions, it would appear that if the question involved in the instant
case were presented, the Supreme Court of Illinois might well
adopt the reasoning in the Thompson case and apply the implied
warranty theory of liability.

F. G.

ANGER

WILLS-ADEMPTION-RE DEMPTION OF STOCKS AND DEPOSIT OF
GENERAL BANK AcCOUNT.-In the recently decided
case of In re Lewis's Will Trusts' the English Court of Chancery
held a legacy of specific stocks which were redeemed by the issuing
company and the proceeds deposited by testator in his general
bank account not to have been adeemed, because the bequest of
the named securities contained the clause "or the investments

PROCEEDS IN

518, 5 N. E. 253, 34 L.R.A. 464 (1896).
30 163 Ill.
App. 382 (1895), sale by retail merchant of pork containing
31 58 Ill.
trichina.
93, 49 N. E. 210 (1898). The court said: "Where, however,
82 171 Ill.
articles of food are purchased from a retail dealer for immediate consumption, the consequences resulting from the purchase of an unsound article
may be so serious and may prove so disastrous to the health and life of the
consumer that public safety demands that there should be an implied warranty on the part of the vendor that the article sold is sound and fit for the
use for which it was purchased."
33 213 Ill. App. 371 (1919).
34 360 Ill.
485, 196 N. E. 461 (1935). "So far as cases of this type may
be considered as having a bearing on the question, we incline to the view
that the cases last cited [those holding that food served by a restaurant
keeper is a sale of the food with an implied warranty] announce the better
rule, but from the nature of those cases do not believe that any of them are
of controlling significance here."
1 [19371 1 Ch, 118.
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representing the same at my death if they shall have been converted into other holdings."
Both in England and in this country an intention to revoke a
legacy has been implied from any act of the testator whereby he
disposes of the subject matter of the legacy after making the
will. 2 And unless the specific property composing it is in testator's possession at the time of his death, a legacy is considered
adeemed and lost to the legatee
In 1789, Lord Chancellor Thurlow said that the only rule to be
adhered to was to see whether the subject of the specific bequest
remained in specie at the time of testator's death, for if it did not
there must be an end to the bequest: and that the idea of discussing what were the particular motives and intention of the testator in each case in destroying the subject of the bequest
would
4
be productive of endless uncertainty and confusion.
To speculate, as did the court in the O'Sullivan case on what
the testator meant by "investment," and to conclude that he
considered a bank deposit included in its definition appears to be
just such an attempt to analyze the testator's motive in banking
the proceeds of his stock and to permit what the court decides
was the testator's intent to override the fact that the subject matter of the legacy has been so changed as not to be identifiable or
even traceable as such.
It would have seemed that the rule holding a specific legacy
lost if the property to which it referred was not in testator's
possession, in specie, at h1-s death, was so firmly e-tablished by
stare decisis as to preclude its alteration by other than legislative
action.
L. WHIDDEN

Harrison v. Jackson, 7 Ch. 339 (1877) ; In re Goodfellow's Estate, 166
Cal. 409, 137 Pa. 12 (1913) ; Kenady v. Sinnott, 179 U. S. 606, 45 L. Ed. 339
(1900) ; Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13 A. 414 (1887).
3 Georgia Infirmary v. Jones, 37 F. 750 (1889), appeal dismissed in 149
U. S. 774, 37 L. Ed. 966 (1892); Welch v. Welch, 147 Miss. 728, 113 So.
197 (1927) ; King v. Sellers, 194 N. C. 533, 140 S.E. 91 (1927) ; Elwyn v.
De Garmendia, 148 Md. 109, 128 A. 913 (1925); Tanton v. Keller, 167
Ill.
129, 47 N. E. 376 (1897).
4 Humphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Cox 185, 30 Eng. Rep. 85 (1789).
2

